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WIPO and the American Constitution:




The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is seeking
to reform U.S. copyright law. The WIPO Treaty on Audiovisual
Performances (AV Treaty) would restrict the communication of actors'
and musicians'performances without authorization. The treaty would
probably make it illegal to display or show clips of performances, or
make a movie or YouThbe video by transforming or adapting other
actors' or musicians' performances, particularly when the original
credits and copyright information are dropped.
This Article analyzes key provisions of the AV Treaty to
ascertain whether they change US law, or merely globalize existing US
doctrines. This Article describes the threat posed to the First
Amendment by the AV Treaty's introduction of performers' moral
rights, and by the outlawing of acts that make performances
"available" to others even without a distribution of clips of them. This
Article analyzes these First Amendment threats using the rubric
provided by Eldred v. Ashcroft. It also outlines the due process
concerns that arise from the AV Treaty's vague language and arbitrary
distinctions, and the Eighth Amendment problems arising from
statutory damages in civil actions regarding the misuse of
performances. Moreover, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
may exacerbate the harms to the Internet inflicted by the AV Treaty, by
requiring criminal charges for the noncommercial use of a
performance.
Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. Thanks are due
to Janewa OseiTutu of Florida International University and the staff of this Journal for their
suggestions and helpful edits.
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Many American businesses and citizens believe that Congress
and the courts have unduly expanded copyright law since the
Copyright Act of 1909 and that copyright is not in need of any further
expansion in terms of its duration, scope, or related rights, such as
moral rights.1 In the nineteenth century and arguably until the
Copyright Act of 1909, copyright's scope was more manageable. 2 In
recent years, copyright has changed from a form of trade regulation
into a regulation of language-even of political speech. 3 The definition
of copyright infringement has grown from printing, reprinting, and
1. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 110 (2001) (suggesting more
than ten years ago that intellectual activity was already too "controlled by law"); David Nimmer,
Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L.
REV. 17, 18 (1999) (suggesting that copyright liability was approaching undesirable extent); Brief
of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 1-2, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 508116 (questioning expansion of secondary
copyright liability since 1984); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED (Jan. 1996),
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper-pr.html (suggesting that proposed
copyright reforms that were enacted in 1998 as Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
represented overextension of copyright liability); see also Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1-3, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
618), 2002 WL 1041846 (questioning expansion of copyright term since 1998); Brief of Amicus
Curiae the Internet Archive in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002)
(No. 01-618), 2001 WL 34092058 (similar); Brief for Intellectual Property Law Professors as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2001
WL 34092058 (similar); cf. Richard A. Posner, Do We Have Too Many Intellectual Property
Rights?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 173, 179 (2005) (exploring question from economic
perspective).
2. See Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213,
1234-35 (1997).
3. See id. at 1232-35, 1239 n.146.
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selling books to include reproducing nonliteral material having
substantial value to another author, displaying or performing
fragmentary content having substantial value to a record company or
movie studio, and making a movie by transforming, recasting, or
adapting information having substantial value to another.
4
The economic justification for this development is that
copyright law is evolving to transfer more of the social value
associated with a copyrighted work back to the copyright owner. The
shift takes value away from the subsequent author or improver, the
reseller or renter of copyrighted material, and the consumer.
5
Consequently, the consumer's interest in the public domain has been
radically scaled back.
6
Part I of this Article describes the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and its role in expanding copyright-like rights
through statutes such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) and the Beijing Treaty on Audio Visual Performances (AV
Treaty). Part II analyzes key provisions of the AV Treaty to
determine whether they change US law, or merely globalize its
existing rules. Part III describes the threat that these changes to US
law pose to the First Amendment. Part IV analyzes these First
Amendment threats using the rubric provided by the Supreme Court
in Eldred v. Ashcroft. Part V outlines the due process concerns that
arise from the AV Treaty's vague language and arbitrary distinctions.
I. WIPO AND THE DMCA
WIPO is an intergovernmental organization affiliated with the
United Nations.7 It has a dual mandate: to develop poor economies by
ensuring technology transfer from rich ones, and to encourage
creativity by promoting the recognition of intellectual property rights.8
WIPO has played an important role in propertizing copyrights
and trademarks-rights akin to trade regulations rather than
4. See id. at 1218-20, 21 n.38, 1262-63.
5. See id. at 1240-41.
6. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual
Property and the Public Domain Part I, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 3-6 (1993); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 654
(1996); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1223-
28, 1244-46 (1996).
7. See Jennifer L. Hanley, Note, ISP Liability and Safe Harbor Provisions:
Implications of Evolving International Law for the Approach Set Out in Viacom v. YouTube, 11 J.
INT'L Bus. & L. 183, 190 (2012).
8. Agreement between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property
Organization, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1974, 956 U.N.T.S. 405, available at http://www.
wipo.intltreaties/en/agreementlindex.html.
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property rights at the time of the founders and under the common law
of Great Britain.9 Mark Lemley argues that, prior to WIPO, it was
relatively uncommon to refer to "intellectual property" at all.10 The
copyright law of the time did not grant every author the right to
pursue everyone who copied his or her work in a game of
Whac-A-Mole.'1  That is a more modern legal spectacle, which
increasingly resembles celebrity-paparazzi lawsuits or 1930s-era
alcohol prohibition.1 2 Trademark law also existed prior to WIPO, but
it provided relatively little protection against noncompetitive uses that
did not tend to defraud consumers.1 3 WIPO has nurtured concepts
such as digital-rights management, trademark dilution, and
cybersquatting from their infancies into fairly vigorous and global
adulthoods.
WIPO became the key vehicle by which concepts alien to US
law, such as "breaking into your own computer" and "documents that
spy on you," have been codified, despite popular opposition.1 4 The
9. See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEx. L.
REV. 873, 895 n.123 (1997) (book review).
10. See id.
11. See id. at 902-03; Sinking the Copyright Pirates: Global Protection of Intellectual
Property: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (noting that
when one widely criticized music download service was shut down, "it became a game of Whac-A-
Mole, as almost immediately several others took its place"). Lemley argues that WIPO has been
central to the "propertization" of statutory rights formerly directed to the promotion of progress
in science and the arts. See Lemley, supra note 9, at 886-87, 895-96. This "propertization," by
condemning imitation as "theft" and invoking the popular impression that property rights have
fewer costs than official monopolies, results in too much protection for intellectual property
owners at the expense of the "free flow of information." See Lemley, supra note 9, at 895-96,
902-03.
12. See Lemley supra note 9, at 902-03; see also Mike Masnick, So Many Similarities
Between Copyright Law and Prohibition, TECHDIRT (Aug. 20, 2012, 7:16 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120817/02295020080/so-many-similarities-between-copyright-
law-prohibition.shtml; cf. Kim See-bong, Encouraging Tattling Among Neighbors, KOREA TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 27246669 ("Like a swarm of buzzing insects, paparazzi
follow their victim relentlessly in their search for a journalistic scoop.").
13. See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising
Age, 108 YALE L. J. 1717, 1719-20 (1999).
14. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Fair Circumvention, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5 n.12 (2008)
("When initial efforts to adopt legislation enacting the White Paper's recommendations
encountered resistance in Congress, however, the Administration turned to the WIPO
process instead."); Derek Khanna, The Most Ridiculous Law of 2013 (So Far): It Is Now
a Crime to Unlock Your Smartphone, ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2013, 10:31 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.comlbusiness/archive/2013/01/the-most-ridiculous-law-of-2013-so-far-it-is-
now-a-crime-to-unlock-your-smartphone/272552 (contending that under WIPO-influenced laws
"it is illegal to unlock new phones to make them available on other carriers"); Samuelson, The
Copyright Grab, supra note 1 (noting that the US Department of Commerce attempted to
persuade WIPO to implement agenda of "[h]elping documents spy on you" by banning tampering
with attachments of "copyright management information to digital forms of their works," and
requiring "online service providers to become copyright police, charged with implementing pay-
per-use rules, . . . cutting off service to scofflaws . . . [and] reporting copyright crime to the
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United States and its trading partners have entered into bilateral
trade agreements that purport to obligate Congress to obey the WIPO
Copyright Treaty (WCT), the WIPO Performance and Phonograms
Treaty (WPPT), and other treaties. 15 It enacted the DMCA and a
statute intended to outlaw the fixation of unfixed musical or dramatic
performances on camera.16 The implications of the latter for
consumers using their smartphones at concerts and sharing the
material online have yet to be considered or decided.17
criminal justice authorities"); Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: Why the Anticircumvention
Regulations Need Revision, COMMC'NS ACM, Sept. 1999, at 17, 17 [hereinafter Samuelson,
Anticircumvention Regulations Need Revision] ("[Slome copyright industry representatives
argued that fair use should not be an acceptable reason to 'break' a technical protection system
used by copyright owners to protect their works, likening this act to burglary ...
Anticircumvention regulations were contentious in the U.S. Congress and at the diplomatic
conference leading up to adoption of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. The main concerns expressed
in both venues were: the harmful effect such rules would likely have on public access to
information and on the ability to make noninfringing uses of copyrighted works ...."); Pamela
Samuelson, Encoding the Law Into Digital Libraries, COMMC'NS ACM, Apr. 1998, at 13, 13
[hereinafter Samuelson, Encoding the Law] ("Delegates to the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) diplomatic conference on digital copyright issues held in Geneva in
December 1996 rejected the Clinton administration's proposal to regulate so-called
circumvention technologies out of concern that this would undermine access to public domain
information and interfere with fair uses and other public purposes of copyright."). Other concepts
alien to US law, such as copyright-like protection for facts, have also been proposed within the
WIPO system. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Legal Protection for Database Contents, COMMONS
ACM, Dec. 1996, at 17, 17 [hereinafter Samuelson, Legal Protection for Database Contents]
(describing how an international committee working with WIPO was poised to recommend "legal
protection for the contents of databases" and why "the facts and theories contained in historical
work" might be a "database" under the proposal).
15. See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter WPPT]; Background and Summary of the WIPO
Audiovisual Performances Treaty, USPTO.GOV (June 2012), www.uspto.gov/newsfWIPOAVP_
TREATYFACTSHEET.pdf [hereinafter USPTO, Summary of WIPO AVP Treaty]; see, e.g.,
Implementation of U.S. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements With Chile and Singapore: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 5 (2003)
(recognizing that "trading partners must adhere to the effective level of copyright protection that
is found in the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and the [WIPO] Copyright Treaty"); SHAYERAH ILIAS & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL34292, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 24
(2011), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159012.pdf ("In general, the
United States has viewed the TRIPS Agreement and WIPO-administered treaties as a minimum
standard and has pursued higher IPR protection and enforcement levels through regional and
bilateral agreements.").
16. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1101, 1201-02 (2012); see also infra note 88 and accompanying
text.
17. For example, the US Code Annotated contains only one case citing the statute. It
involved a commercial use of a performance recorded prior to the statute's effective date. That
court initially stated that it was unconstitutional but later reversed that decision. See 17 U.S.C.A
§ 1101 (West 2012); Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int'l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D.
Cal. 2004), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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II. KEY PROVISIONS RELATED TO ONLINE AUDIOVISUAL
COMMUNICATION
In 2012, representatives of forty-eight countries signed the AV
Treaty.18 A few of its provisions promise to have significant impacts
on constitutional rights in the United States.
The treaty provides performers in signatory states with the
exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, or make available a
performance. 19 Article 6 seems to grant a broad new right to restrict
the "communication" of unfixed performances not already broadcast,
with some exceptions that "may"-but need not-be granted.20 Article
12 contemplates additional royalties to be paid to performers,
irrespective of existing contracts governing performances embodied in
movies, songs, television shows, or video games. 21 The US Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) contends that these rights do not change
existing law because US law already treats actors and musicians as
"authors... with copyright rights."22  This is not entirely true with
regard to traditional federal copyright law, which did not protect
"unfixed performances." 23 Under the Copyright Act of 1976, even the
director "is treated as a hired hand, rather than the creative and
artistic force behind [a] film," so that "the author of a film is the
person or entity for whom the work was prepared, in other words, the
producer or studio, not the director."24  State law also did not
18. See Press Release, US Dep't of State, Signing of Audiovisual Performances Treaty
(June 26, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/19410l.htm ("Today in Beijing, the
United States joined 47 other countries in signing a treaty to strengthen the rights of
audiovisual performers around the world.").
19. See Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, arts. 5-12, June 24, 2012, WIPO
Doc. AVPJDC/20 [hereinafter AV Treaty], available at http://www.wipo.intledocs/mdocs/
copyright/enavp-dcavp-dc_20.pdf.
20. See id. art. 6.
21. See id. art. 12.
22. See USPTO, Summary of WIPO AVP Treaty, supra note 14, at 2 ("Under U.S. law,
actors and musicians are considered to be 'authors' of their performances providing them with
copyright rights. Just as the rights established in U.S. law already provide the protection for
musical performers mandated by the WPPT, U.S. law is already generally compatible with the
AVP provisions. (This was also the Administration's view in 2000.) Nonetheless, implementation
of the AVP may require some technical amendments of the Copyright Act ... ").
23. See Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 297 (D.N.J. 1993) ("[Plaintiff] argues
that this is not preempted because the common law protects against radio and live, and other
manner of unfixed performances of the plaintiffs composition done without his permission. It is
true that the federal copyright statute expressly withheld preemption from works 'not fixed in
any tangible medium of expression."'); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976) ("[An unfixed work of
authorship, such as an improvisation or an unrecorded choreographic work, performance, or
broadcast, would continue to be subject to protection under State common law or statute, but
would not be eligible for Federal statutory protection under section 102.").
24. David A. Honicky, Film Labelling As a Cure for Colorization and Other Alterations:
A Band-Aid for a Hatchet Job, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 409, 416 (1994); see also Mira T.
[Vol. 16:1:45
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necessarily protect performances under the common law unless a
plaintiff could show actionable misappropriation. 25 There is some
indication that performances were fair game under state law for
anything short of "bad faith" misappropriation. 26 For example, if
actors as well as movie studios were copyright owners in
motion-picture performances, then presumably each of the actors
could have sued the videocassette and DVD companies for making
allegedly unlicensed use of their performances. 27 Such claims were so
tenuous as not to be filed in the vast majority of cases.
28
The making-available right, in particular, would radically
transform existing US law. The derivative-work right in the United
States does not extend to communicating the content of a work or to
making it available without a fixed tangible item that contains
material from the work and that uses the material for a similar
Sundara Rajan, Center Stage: Performers and Their Moral Rights in the WPPT, 57 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 767, 770-71 (2007) ("Copyright law has traditionally understood performers to be
engaged in the dissemination of information or culture, rather than creating works of art in their
own right .... [Moral rights for performers codify for the first time the theory that performers
are harmed by] the failure to acknowledge them as the creators of their own performances, or to
preserve the integrity of their interpretations.").
25. See, e.g., Ippolito v. Lennon, 542 N.Y.S.2d 3, 5-6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
26. See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 915-16 (2d Cir. 1952)
(questioning whether plagiarism of uncopyrighted aspects of plaintiffs work could be actionable
under common law without bad-faith conduct such as misrepresenting the source of the
defendant's product as some entity other than defendant); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v.
Computer Automation, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 424, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing the common law
claim of unfair competition based on taking of content because the complaint did not allege a
"bad faith misappropriation of the labors and expenditures of another, likely to cause confusion
or to deceive purchasers as to the origin of goods"); Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Pico Prods., Inc.,
682 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (dismissing claim under common law for taking of
content, holding that "[u]nder Federal or State law, the gravamen of a claim of unfair
competition is the bad faith misappropriation of a commercial advantage belonging to another by
infringement or dilution of a trademark or trade name or by exploitation of proprietary
information or trade secrets"); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 252 N.Y.S.2d 553,
554-55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (in case based on "identical reproductions" of Beatles records, court
found liability because defendant's work was misrepresented "as if it was the bona fide product
of the plaintiff' working a fraud and deception on the public); Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 23-
24, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., 372 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2000) (No. 03-7859),
2000 WL 34547616 ("Cases analyzing unfair competition doctrine as applied to pre-1972 sound
recordings uniformly stand for the proposition that something more than mere commercial use of
an alleged intellectual property right is required to support a cause of action for unfair
competition.... Decisions from this Court and others squarely reject the notion that a claim of
unfair competition can exist without a showing of bad faith on the part of the defendant.").
27. Most of these cases have involved parties other than actors or singers. See, e.g.,
Muller v. Walt Disney Prods., 871 F. Supp. 678, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The home video release of
'Fantasia' has spawned several lawsuits [from parties other than composers]."). This is
consistent with the focus of copyright law on 'Writings" that are "fixed."
28. But see Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 169-72
(D.D.C. 1992) (concluding that where plaintiff musician granted to television producers the right
to reproduce his performance "perpetually and throughout the world ... [sic] in and by all media
and means whatever," this included subsequent videocassette usage).
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purpose.29  Moreover, existing law often does not treat online
streaming as a violation of copyright law. 30
WIPO's position, however, is that the expansion of copyright
has no negative impact on the rights of subsequent users or of
consumers, who have no rights to create imitative works. WIPO
believes that:
Authors of derivative works have no particular right to create them in the first place.
Copyright law prevents anyone from modifying or distributing [the work] without the
explicit permission of the copyright holder-permission granted usually through a
license. The copyright holder, choosing to grant the permission to modify, is free to set
any conditions on the license.
3 1
New artists are at the mercy of initial producers, who may
withhold a license on a whim, in this vision of creativity. WIPO
launched a public campaign that reproduced a statement from the
actor Javier Bardem, who said that actors would like to control "the
29. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Game Genie device that altered private performances of Nintendo
games without reproducing them was not a derivative work because no fixation of the altered
performances was created, reproduced, or distributed); Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v RDR Books,
575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that online encyclopedia of Harry Potter
universe was not a derivative work of the novels because it did not have the same purpose).
30. The Copyright Act defines it as a potential infringement "to perform the copyrighted
work publicly," 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), and defines a performance to include acts that "transmit or
otherwise communicate a performance ... of the work ... to the public ... whether the members
of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times," id. § 101. But where an intermediary service
is established, such as a cloud-storage service or a repository of links to where videos may be
streamed, the intermediary may not "publicly" perform the work. See, e.g., Flava Works, Inc. v.
Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 756, 758, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding where "myVidster creates a web
page that makes the video appear to be on myVidster's site," but "the video is being transmitted
directly from the server on which the video is stored to the viewer's computer," that "the viewer.
. .determines when the performance begins, and it is odd to think that every transmission of an
uploaded video is a public performance," and, additionally, that the service was not an infringing
reproduction "unless those visitors copy the videos they are viewing on the infringers' websites")
(citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 2007)); Cartoon
Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (streaming video is not a
public performance when viewer decides when performance begins, potentially in the privacy of
his or her home); cf. In re Napster, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 804-05 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("[A]
copyright owner seeking to establish that his or her copyrighted work was distributed in
violation of section 106(3) must prove that the accused infringer either (1) actually disseminated
one or more copies of the work to members of the public or (2) offered to distribute copies of that
work for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display."); MELVILLE
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11 [A] (2011) ("[A] public performance of a
work, even if unauthorized, does not infringe the distribution right. Transmissions qualify as
public performance, meaning liability for that conduct lies outside the distribution right.").
31. WIPO Secretariat, Comm. on Dev. and Intellectual Prop., Using Copyright to
Promote Access to Information and Creative Content, 13-14, WIPO DOC. NO. CDIP/9/INF3,
(Mar. 25, 2012) (addressing "a modified version or extension of an original work of software"),
available at http://www.wipo.intledocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip-9/cdip-9-inf_3.pdf.
WIPO AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
use of their performances on the Internet," including "non-commercial
uses."32  Starting on June 20, 2012, Bardem and other actors,
including Meryl Streep and Mei Baojiu, argued in favor of adopting
the treaty.33  WIPO has also noted that some countries permit
governments to own intellectual property rights and that WIPO might
draft a model law in this area. The law could eventually regulate
noncommercial uses of congressional and judicial "performances"
under the AV Treaty, limiting access to public hearings and oral
arguments.
34
This issue has arisen before. 35 The WPPT, which the United
States ratified in 1999, potentially created new "rights of distribution
and making available on the Internet, and the safeguarding of
technological protection measures."36  The DMCA, however, only
implemented the new right of distribution and rights against the
circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs).37 Courts
eventually held that merely making available a work without actually
distributing it did not violate the Copyright Act.38 The struggle
continues in the negotiations that may lead to the conclusion of a
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) treaty on the model of the North
32. Statement by Javier Bardem to the High Level Copyright Dialogue on the Film
Industry, WIPO (July 11, 2011), http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/copyright-dialogue/
statements/bardem.html.
33. Press Release, WIPO, WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances is
Concluded (June 26, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release, WIPO Beijing Treaty Concluded],
available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2012/article_0013.html.
34. See WIPO Secretariat, supra note 31, at 67-68.
35. See William New, WIPO Lauded for New Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual
Performances, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 29, 2012, 4:54 AM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/06/
29/wipo-lauded-for-new-beijing-treaty-on-audiovisual-performances; cf. Samuelson, The
Copyright Grab, supra note 1 (discussing the Clinton administration's plans to rescind
"traditional user rights to browse, share, or make private noncommercial copies of copyrighted
works").
36. Samuelson, supra note 1.
37. See Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 1201,
1202, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see also US
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
SUMMARY (1998).
38. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding that Google did not infringe audiovisual performances available by offering access to
unauthorized passwords to websites containing copies of them so as to make them available to
users); In re Napster, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that the Copyright
Act requires proof of actual copying or distribution or performance or display); see also Atl.
Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (D. Ariz. 2008) (collecting cases); Atl.
Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 281-82 (D. Conn. 2008) (collecting cases);
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 173 (D. Mass. 2008) (collecting cases).
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).39  According to a
comparison of the TPP with existing US law prepared by the
non-governmental organization (NGO) Public Knowledge, current law
"only prohibits a person from distributing, importing for distribution,
or publicly performing works, while the TPP also includes ... making
available works."
40
Article 5 of the AV Treaty states that, independent of any
economic rights and even after the transfer of them, a performer has a
right to control the use of his or her fixed, live performances.
41
Specifically, the performer may "object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of his performances that would be prejudicial to his
reputation, taking due account of the nature of audiovisual
fixations. '42 Article 16 also calls for civil remedies for communicating
or making available to the public those "copies of performances fixed
in audiovisual fixations knowing that electronic rights management
information has been removed or altered without authority."
43
Article 15 of the AV Treaty could provide legal reinforcement
for the use of digital rights management (DRM) and TPMs to restrict
fair use of online content, following prior applications of DRM
technology to eBooks and DVDs.44 Article 16 requires parties to
39. See TPP us US Law: The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE, http://tppinfo.org/resources/tpp-vs-us-law (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3) (2012)).
40. Id.
41. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 5.
42. Id. Similarly, WPPT Article 5 states:
Independently of a performer's economic rights, and even after the transfer of those
rights, the performer shall, as regards his live aural performances or performances
fixed in phonograms, have the right to claim to be identified as the performer of his
performances, except where omission is dictated by the manner of the use of the
performance, and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his
performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation.
WPPT, supra note 15, art. 5. So Article 5(1) of the WPPT guarantees to performers the right to
claim credit for a performance and the right of integrity for live aural performances and
performances fixed in phonograms. Id. A proposal to require serious harm to a performer before
he or she could stop an alteration was rejected in 1996 at a diplomatic conference of states
parties. Since 2001, Chinese law has provided an apparently unqualified right to object to such
alterations, which "goes far beyond the standards set by the majority of foreign laws and by Art.
5(1) of the [WPPT]." PETER GANEA & THOMAS PAPTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA
261 (Christopher Heath ed., 2005); see also Yong Wan, Legal Protection of Performers' Rights in
the Chinese Copyright Law, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 669, 679, 684 (2009).
43. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 16.
44. See id. art. 15; Carolina Rossini, Mitch Stoltz & Yana Welinder, Beijing Treaty on
Audiovisual Performances: We Need to Read the Fine Print, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
DEEPLINKS BLOG (July 24, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/07/beijing-treaty-
audiovisual-performances ("Article 15 of the Beijing Treaty could be used to establish sanctions
for additional Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies to protect the new 'performers'
rights' for works that would not otherwise be subject to DRMs. As was the case with the DMCA,
this could prevent important fair use applications of the material."). For a discussion of issues
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provide civil remedies against those who negligently facilitate the
distribution, importation for distribution, communication, or making
available to the public of performances fixed in audiovisual media
where the facilitator knows that "electronic rights management
information has been removed or altered without authority."45 This
would appear to prohibit, for example, the use of clips of news
broadcasts, films, or television shows with the copyright notices,
credits, or contractual use terms intentionally omitted, even when
used negligently in transformative works such as documentary films,
news reports, parodies, and lip-synching videos. YouTube, according
to many scholars, makes performances available to the public. 46 Does
this mean that YouTube must remove all performances stripped of
their original terms of use, for instance from cnn.com or cspan.org?
Further, is a parody or lip-synching video a "copy" of a performance
because it makes the performance perceptible to the human ear? A
copy need not be literal or verbatim under many countries' laws.
47
Read together with the preceding articles of the AV Treaty,
Article 16 requires parties to provide civil remedies against those who
negligently facilitate the availability or distribution of a performance,
while knowing or having reason to know that the credits or
terms of use have been omitted. 48  Existing US law has a
copyright-management information provision (17 U.S.C. § 1202(a)),
but it requires intentional removal or alteration of the information for
purposes of infringement, not mere negligence. 49  A negligence
with fair use of eBooks and DVDs in the past, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking
Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1140 (2009); Dana B. Robinson, Digital Rights
Management Lite: Freeing Ebooks from Reader Devices and Software, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 152
(2012).
45. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 16.
46. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Scary Monsters: Hybrids, Mashups, and Other
Illegitimate Children, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2133 (2011).
47. WIPO-OECS Colloquium for the Judiciary on the Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights, July 28-29, 2006, Roseau, Dominica, The Private Sector and the
Enforcement of 1P Rights: (B) Copyright Based Industries, 6, WIPO-OECS/IP/JUROS/06/5
(July 20, 2006), available at www.wipo.intledocs/mdocslac/en/wipooecs-ipju-ros_06/
wipo-oecsip-ju ros_06_5.pdf; Uma Suthersanen, Copyright in the Courts: The Da Vinci Code,
WIPO MAGAZINE, June 2006, http://www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/2006/03/article_0004.html.
48. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 16.
49. See Gordon v. Nextel Commc'ns & Mullen Adver., Inc., 345 F.3d 922, 927 (6th Cir.
2003) ("A section 1202(b)(1) violation occurs when a person (i) without authority of the copyright
owner or the law (ii) intentionally removes or alters any copyright management information (iii)
knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that it will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal
an infringement of the federal copyright laws."); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1121-22 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("Section 1202(a) prohibits falsification of copyright management
information with the intent to aid copyright infringement. . . . [Plaintiff has no such claim
because] even if § 1202(b)(1) applied, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence showing Defendant's
actions were intentional, rather than merely an unintended side effect of the [Web] crawler's
operation."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
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standard would wreak havoc with contemporary art and business
models. Does Article 16 mean that YouTube or Netflix must be liable
if it should have known that a documentary by Michael Moore that it
makes available uses an actor's voice without permission or without
the credits from the original movie? 50 Is the musician Girl Talk liable
for playing thousands of uncredited samples?
5 1
Although Article 13 of the AV Treaty provides that parties
may establish similar exceptions and limitations to the
audiovisual-protection right as they do for copyright, the second
paragraph states that such exceptions and limitations must not injure
the normal licensing expectations of the owner of any right in the
audiovisual performance.5 2 That is not US law, as applied by the US
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bill Graham Archives v.
Dorling Kindersley Ltd., and the District Court for the Southern
District of New York in Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. and Authors
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust.5
3
Could the United States someday face World Trade
Organization (WTO) charges for allowing fair use of audiovisual clips
on YouTube and be pressured to reform its copyright law in response?
Article 70 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement (TRIPS) refers to "acts... which become infringing under
the terms of legislation in conformity with this Agreement," and says
that it "gives rise to obligations in respect of all subject matter...
which meets or comes subsequently to meet the criteria for protection
50. See Fahrenheit 9/11, YOUTUBE (June 19, 2012), www.youtube.com/watch?v-
cYOOCdHICCo.
51. See Tom Breihan, Watch a 20-Minute Girl Talk Documentary, STEREOGUM (Sept. 7,
2011, 5:16 PM), http://stereogum.com/802931/watch-a-20-minute-girl-talk-documentary/video.
52. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 13.
53. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir.
2006) ("[A] publisher's willingness to pay license fees for reproduction of images does not
establish that the publisher may not, in the alternative, make fair use of those images.");
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136(DC), 2013 WL 6017130, at *8, 10 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 14, 2013) (holding that "fair use has been found even where a defendant benefitted
commercially from the unlicensed use of copyrighted works" and that failure to pay license fee
does not result in infringement where defendant's use "enhances the sales of [the work] to the
benefit of copyright holders"); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 463
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that defendant's use of digitized books could
normally be licensed by Copyright Clearance Center because "[w]ere a court automatically to
conclude in every case that potential licensing revenues were impermissibly impaired simply
because the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, the fourth factor
would always favor the copyright owner." (quoting Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614)); see
also Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (reasoning that
even though, in many cases, market existed for digital licensing of excerpts of texts assigned by
university faculty, storage of them on a university computer server for students to access
digitally was typically a fair use given the limited use and educational purpose).
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under the terms of this Agreement."54 Canada has stated to the WTO
that this Article is triggered by "acts which were not infringing at that
time but which subsequently became infringing once... [rights] are
issued in accordance with the enabling legislation."55  Additionally,
Article 71 states that members may amend TRIPS to adjust to new
multilateral agreements that all members of the WTO accept.
5 6
Other countries could argue that the AV Treaty creates
exclusive rights that give rise to WTO dispute-resolution authority
involving Article 13 of TRIPS, which, in turn, says that limitations or
exceptions to exclusive rights should not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work.57 The European Communities successfully
made this argument in a WTO case about a key small-business
defense against copyright claims.58 In that proceeding, the WTO
defined an abnormal exception as one reducing copyright holders'
revenue by a significant amount.59 WTO findings could also have a
domino effect, as the growth of exclusive rights where there were once
exemptions may be used as evidence that the remaining exceptions
are abnormal. Once a particular use becomes illegal, payments for
licenses may become more common, significantly altering authors' or
performers' normal expectations of compensation.60 Situations in
which "one source of music is free of charge while another triggers
copyright liability may have a significant impact on which source of
music the operators of establishments choose, and on how much they
are willing to pay for protected music." 61  In addition, each
54. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 70, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
55. Responses of Canada to Written Questions from the Panel, Canada-Term of Patent
Protection, WT/DS170/R (Jan. 7, 2000), available at http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/
fileviewer?id=33358.
56. TRIPS, supra note 54, art. 71.
57. See id. art. 13; cf. Samuelson, Legal Protection for Database Contents, supra note 13
("While the draft treaty seemed to contemplate that nations could limit the rights of database
owners, it restricted such limitations to those that would not unreasonably conflict with the
normal exploitation of the database or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
rights holder. Given the criteria for determining which takings are 'substantial,' it is fair to
interpret the draft treaty as effectively forbidding exceptions to allow the extraction and use of
substantial parts of databases for scientific research purposes. Even the EU's narrow limitations
for purposes of scientific illustration might not satisfy the draft WIPO database treaty
provision.").
58. Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R
(June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section 110 Panel Report].
59. Id., 6.180, 6.183, 6.241.
60. Cf. Samuelson, Legal Protection for Database Contents, supra note 13 (arguing that
database-protection laws may create an expectation to license scientific data, creating knowledge
monopolies).
61. Section 110 Panel Report, supra note 58, [ 6.241.
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WIPO-inspired treaty may be a "one-way ratchet" that increas'es
copyright liability even in areas where it should be scaled back.6 2
Even if no parties bring WTO claims, the United States may
experience pressure to reform its copyright law in response to its AV
Treaty obligations. 63 WIPO and the WTO did not force the United
States to act on previous occasions, but Congress amended US law to
conform to international-treaty expectations anyway. The US
Congress chose to amend the Copyright Act in 1989 and the Patent
Act in 2011 to conform to an emerging international consensus. 64 The
United States independently amended its copyright laws to aid
copyright holders who ignore statutory formalities. 65 More recently,
Congress amended patent law to give subsequent inventors or alleged
infringers a claim to ownership of a patent in cases where the original
inventor waited too long to file. 66 These are other precedents for
amending US law for purposes of international harmonization, like
the 1998 copyright extension did in theory, if not in practice. 67
62. See Recent Case, Copyright-Constitutional Constraints-Tenth Circuit Subjects
Copyright Statute to First Amendment Scrutiny.- Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (1Oth Cir.
2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 1945, 1949 (2008) ("Modern copyright legislation has been 'a one-way
ratchet,' granting increased protection to copyright holders, and for longer periods of time....
One illustration of the one-way ratchet is the [DMCA], which prohibits circumvention of
technological protection measures such as encryption.").
63. Cf. AV Treaty, supra note 19.
64. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
65. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853.
66. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011);
David Kappos, Under Sec'y of Commerce for IP & Dir. of the USPTO, Remarks at the WIPO
Symposium: Promoting Innovation and Creativity (Sept. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2011/kappos-wipo.jsp ("The legislation transitions the U.S.
from a focus on what inventors do in secret, to a focus on what they do to make their inventions
available to the public by disclosure or sale of a product or by other means. It .. .moves other
areas of [US] patent law to international norms."); see also Harmonization, USPTO.GOV,
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/aia-harmonization.jsp (last modified Dec. 7, 2012, 11:28 AM)
('The America Invents Act paves the way for greater patent harmonization-the alignment of
laws and procedures among intellectual property systems to ensure consistency and clarity of
rights for the world's innovators."); Susan B. Meyer, 2011 America Invents Act Patent Reform
(unpublished slideshow), available at http://www.sdbor.edu/services/academics/IP/documents/
AIA_PPT.PPT (noting that traditional US patent law's norm of "first inventor" protection "made
work within various IP treaties difficult," so US law was amended in 2011 to allow the second
inventor to get the patent in some circumstances, despite resulting unfairness to first inventor
whose innovation goes unrewarded).
67. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188, 205-06 (2003) (upholding Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 against First Amendment and Copyright Clause challenges in part
because "Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same copyright
protection in Europe as their European counterparts"). But see Brief of Intellectual Property Law
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), 2002
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Assuming that the United States reforms the Copyright Act to
reflect the AV Treaty's reforms, performers' rights may be codified in a
way that omits US copyright law's meager public-interest protections.
When WIPO led the drafting of the WCT and the WPPT, the treaties
merely obligated states to ban circumvention of TPMs with respect to
"acts... which are not authorized by the authors concerned or
permitted by law."68 In other words, the drafters did not intend these
treaties to prohibit circumvention in order to make a fair use. Yet one
court found that plaintiffs may utilize the DMCA, which codified the
WCT, to pursue defendants who otherwise committed no unlawful
conduct, potentially inhibiting the speech of "technologically
unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of encrypted
copyrighted works without the technical means of doing so. 169 The
right to make fair use of encrypted works is a very important one
because copyright holders often refuse a license unless they receive
royalties.70 Copying a clip from a prior performance into a subsequent
audiovisual work is essential to many forms of journalism, political
speech, and parody.71  Without expensive newsroom equipment,
Internet users may resort to "ripping" Web streams. 72
WL 1041866, at *17-19 (May. 20, 2002) (arguing that extension did not harmonize US and
European law).
68. Armstrong, supra note 14, at 5-6 (citing the WCT and the WPPT).
69. Id. at 15 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,
324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); see also id. at 18 n.95 ("[S]ince the fair use doctrine is not a defense to the
act of gaining unauthorized access to a work, the act of circumventing a technological measure in
order to gain access is prohibited." (quoting US COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 4 (1998), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf)).
70. Cf. Pierre N. Leval, 'lbward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1124
(1990); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 5 (1997).
71. See Patricia Aufderheide et al., Copyright, Free Speech, and the Public's Right to
Know: How Journalists Think About Fair Use 5 (July 30, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2119933; Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing
and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 799 (2010);
Collette Leland, All's Fair in Love and News: How the Current Application of the Fair Use
Doctrine Favors the Traditional Media over Amateur Providers of News Content, 8 WAKE FOREST
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226, 228 (2008); Daxton R. "Chip" Stewart, Can I Use This Photo I Found on
Facebook? Applying Copyright Law and Fair Use Analysis to Photographs on Social Networking
Sites Republished for News Reporting Purposes, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 93, 93 (2012);
Madhavi Sunder, From Free Culture to Fair Culture, 4 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. J. 20, 24
(2012); Tushnet, Scary Monsters, supra note 46, at 2135-36 (2011).
72. See, e.g., Anthony King, How to Rip Streaming Video, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/
how_5028768_rip-streaming-video.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) ("Whether on YouTube,
Google Video or just a random website, the Internet is full of embedded streaming video....
There is a simple process you can use to save streaming video directly to the computer's desktop,
without downloading any programs or files."); Lindsay Pietroluongo, How to Create a Video
Mash-Up, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/how 12167378_create-video-mashup.html (last visited
Oct. 28, 2013) (discussing the second step in making a mashup: "Gather the videos that will be
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The TPP may reinforce the AV Treaty. Article 4.10 of the TPP
requires parties to criminalize the intentional removal of
copyright-management information from copyrighted work when done
en route to infringement, and to impose civil liability for the negligent
removal of the information.73  Analyzing Article 4.10 and other
provisions, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argues that
the TPP could set the stage for "worldwide crackdowns on Internet
activity by a coordinated authority that could work at cross-purposes
with the laws and policies of the participating countries."74 In this
respect, it resembles the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA) and Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA).7 5 Expected as early as
2014, the TPP would, according to a US proposal, impose civil liability
for the removal of copyright terms or other "rights management
information" from a copy of a copyrighted work as part of the mere
facilitation of infringement.
76
Both the AV Treaty and the TPP may represent substantial
steps towards enacting WIPO's Model Copyright Law (Model Law).
The Model Law has provisions echoing those of the AV and TPP
treaties. 77 It would create liability for "the removal or alteration of
any electronic rights management information without authority" and
"the distributing,... communicating to the public or making available
to the public, without authority, of works, performances, phonograms
or broadcasts, knowing or having reason to know that rights
management information has been removed or altered without
authority."78  This creates civil liability for negligently removing
'mashed' together. Choose from a video catalog at a library, personal footage or video websites
like YouTube or Google Video.").
73. See TPP vs US Law, supra note 39 (art. 4.10 of leaked TPP documents).
74. Sandra Fulton, An International SOPA?, FREE FUTURE (June 25, 2012, 3:51 PM),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech-national-security-technology-and-liberty/international-sopa.
75. See id.; Hanley, supra note 7, at 191, 200.
76. See TPP vs US Law, supra note 39. As Timothy Armstrong notes, courts have found
that copyright owners have attempted to utilize the DMCA where there was no evidence of
copyright infringement and even where they "were abusing the DMCA as a means of gaining
improper advantage over a competitor in the marketplace." Armstong, supra note 14, at 2 (citing
Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 431 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Chamberlain Grp. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Lexmark Int'l,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004)).
77. See Draft Copyright Bill, § 46 (Ant. & Barb.), (quoted in Responses to Questions
Posed by Canada, the European Communities and Their Member States, Japan, Switzerland,
and the United States, Review of Legislation, IP/C/W/317 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=33358); CAROLYN DEERE, THE
IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 204 (2008) (noting that the Antigua and Barbuda
law was based on the WIPO model).
78. Copyright Act 2002, art. 30 (Act No. 12/2002) (Tonga); cf. also Copyright Act 1987,
art. 36(4) (Act No. 332/2006) (Malay.) (adopting similar language apparently based on WIPO
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rights-management information from an audiovisual performance in
order to communicate the performance or make it available to others
without permission. 79 The way that rights holders, like those who
sued All Headline News and Shepard Fairey, construe the phrase
"rights-management information," the display of an image from a clip
without the credits would be unlawful.
80
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEMS WITH THE WIPO COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
The AV Treaty threatens the freedom of speech by creating
moral rights that could lead to endless litigation concerning
mashups.81 Article 5 states that a performer shall "have the right...
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his
performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation."8 2  Many
YouTube videos are mashups of news, entertainment, or public affairs
model law on copyright and related rights for developing countries); Copyright and Neighbouring
Rights Act of 1999, art. 44 (Tanz.) (using similar language).
79. Cf. Baltimore & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1877) (negligence
is the failure to do what should have been done or what a reasonable person would do in the
circumstances).
80. See Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 461-62
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims of Defendant J 65, 180-86,
Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 Civ. 01123 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2009) (No. 09-01123), 2009 WL
648762 ("In light of Plaintiffs' willful, unauthorized use of The AP's Obama Photo, The AP has no
choice but to assert claims for damages and injunctive relief based on Plaintiffs' copyright
infringement under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., and violation of the
[DMCA], 17 U.S.C. § 1202, as well as a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and
2202 that Plaintiffs have no copyrights in the Infringing Works."). The Associated Press also
sued Fairey's customers. See Shelly Rosenfeld, A Photo Finish? Copyright and Shepard Fairey's
Use of a News Photo Image of the President, 36 VT. L. REV. 355, 356 n.5 (2011) (citing Larry
Neumeister, AP Sues Urban Outfitters, Nordstrom Over Obama 'Hope' Poster Use, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 11, 2011, 6:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/11/ap-urban-
obama n_834785.html). Fairey's complaint alleged that between January 29 and February 6,
2009, the Associated Press threatened to sue him, but that he sued for declaratory judgment
first. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief 1 35-50, Fairey v. Associated
Press, No. 09 Civ. 01123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009), 2009 WL 319564. The premise of the Associated
Press counterclaims under the DMCA would arguably apply to many Facebook or Pinterest
photos, YouTube videos, and other Web content:
Upon information and belief, Fairey, without authority of The AP or the law, has
intentionally removed and/or altered and has caused and induced others to remove
and/or alter copyright management information from The AP's Obama Photo,
including for use in the Infringing Works, and have thereafter distributed said works,
having reasonable grounds to know that such acts will induce, enable, facilitate or
conceal an infringement of copyright ... in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(1) and (3).
Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims of Defendant, supra, I 182-83.
81. See AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 15. Mashups are videos, frequently posted to
streaming video sites like YouTube or Dailymotion, which juxtapose video clips from a single or
multiple film or television program to convey a message distinct from the original work.
82. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 5.
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videos with additional commentary or montage.8 3 They resemble The
Daily Show with Jon Stewart, The O'Reilly Factor, or Glenn Beck's
programs on CNN Headline News, then Fox News, and more recently,
The Blaze-shows that splice together footage and add commentary.8 4
Although it is difficult to believe that they always get permission, it is
possible that Viacom, News Corp., and Time Warner license some
footage. It is doubtful that they license all of the quotations and
screenshots that they use from newspapers, books, YouTube, and
Facebook.8 5 Mashups and other YouTube videos that appropriate
clips from news and popular culture let "people with somewhat limited
financial resources to talk back to mass culture in language that
83. One example is "Autotune the News," which comments upon nightly news
conventions by making them into R&B music videos. Carol Vernallis, Music Video and YouTube:
New Aesthetics and Generic Transformations, in REWIND, PLAY, FAST FORWARD: THE PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE MUSIC VIDEO 234, 234 n.5 (Henry Keazor & Thorsten Wiibbena
eds., 2010). Another is "Planet of the Arabs," a short film posted to YouTube which uses clips
from many years of film and television to comment upon the portrayal of Arabs by Hollywood.
Brief Amici Curiae of Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of Appellee and
Affirmance at 24-25, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012) (Nos.
11-2820, 11-2858), 2012 WL 725741. A third is "Bush and Blair's Endless Love," parodying a
political alliance to the tune of the Lionel Richie and Diana Ross duet. MATTHEW RIMMER,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION: HANDS OFF MY IPOD 132 (2010).
84. The mashup therefore resembles the style to which some writers attribute the
success of The Daily Show or The Glenn Beck Show, i.e., reappropriation and transformation of
mainstream media symbols and doctrines. Cf. Jeremy Gillick, Meet Jonathan Stuart Leibowitz
(aka Jon Stewart), MOMENT, http://www.momentmag.com/meet-jonathan-stuart-leibowitz-aka-
jon-stewart (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (describing how The Daily Show with Jon Stewart won
"critical and popular acclaim and ... [eleven] Emmy Awards" over the first nine years, making
its host one of the four "most admired journalists in America," using a "trademark editing
technique of playing back-to-back clips of politicians contradicting themselves has garnered that
highest form of flattery: imitation by the very networks Stewart mocks," after the host's initial
show "lasted [only] two seasons."); Mark McBeth & Randy Clemons, Is Fake News the Real
News? The Significance of Stewart and Colbert for Democratic Discourse, Politics, and Policy, in
THE STEWART/COLBERT EFFECT: ESSAYS ON THE REAL IMPACTS OF FAKE NEWS 80, 84 (Amarnath
Amarasingam ed., 2011) (arguing that like Stewart, Glenn Beck uses a "highly postmodern
mixing of entertainment, commentary, and news" to convey to the viewer a "construction of
reality"). Madhavi Sunder, incorporating work by the Finnish Ministry of Education, has called
the opportunity for everyone to reappropriate and transform symbols "fair culture," or "the
realization of cultural rights and the inclusion of everyone in cultural signification, irrespective
of their age, gender, ability, or ethnic, religious or cultural background." Sunder, From Free
Culture to Fair Culture, supra note 71, at 23-24 (quoting Hannele Koivunen & Leena Marsio,
Ethics and Policy, D'Art Topics in Arts Policy No. 24 (2008), available at
http://www.ifacca.org/topic/ethics-in-cultural-policy). This recalls the work of Sonia Katyal, who
argues that the consumer of news, entertainment, fashion, and other cultural products should be
able to comment on, criticize, satirize, and parody them. See Katyal, Stealth Marketing and
Antibranding, supra note 70, at 849.
85. See Aufderheide, supra note 71, at 5 ("News moguls such as Rupert Murdoch
inveigh against fair use ... even while their own staff are employing it openly in order to do the
work of the day.") (citations omitted); see also Leland, supra note 71, at 228; Stewart, supra note
70, at 93.
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audiences are ready to hear."8 6  With YouTube, anyone can be on
"television."
8 7
The AV Treaty's copyright-management right compounds the
problem posed by its moral rights. There are already precedents for
using the removal of "rights management information" from a remix
in an attempt to censor artists and other creators of fair-use works.
For example, the video search engine Veoh went bankrupt defending
suits over storing users' videos that allegedly contained infringing
clips of copyrighted music, even though the Ninth Circuit upheld a
lower court ruling that the site complied with the safe harbor for
websites set forth in the DMCA.88 The Associated Press sued the
artist Shepard Fairey, who made the Obama "Hope" poster, for
removing from his stylized version of President Obama's visage the
copyright-management information attached to the image of Obama
after the Associated Press fixed it in a photograph.8 9 The organization
also sued an online news aggregator for providing excerpts of news
articles to nonsubscribers without the original rights-management
data. 90 John Bergmayer of Public Knowledge has argued: "Creating
new kinds of 'middleman rights' could increase the complexity of
dealing with content exponentially. It could give broadcasters the
right to prevent recording shows for later viewing, or even effectively
86. Tushnet, Scary Monsters, supra note 46, at 2154.
87. See DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: How MASS
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 40, 143 (2008).
88. See Yvette Joy Liebesman & Benjamin Wilson, The Mark of a Resold Good, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 157, 166 (2012) ("Veoh Networks, which, even though it was cleared of copyright
infringement liability, was fatally wounded defending itself. 'Veoh is legal, but Veoh is
dead-killed by rightsowner lawfare that bled it dry. Meanwhile, rightsowners wrongly assessed
the legality of Veoh, but the worst consequence they suffered was overpaying their lawyers."'
(quoting Eric Goldman, UMG v. Shelter Capital: A Cautionary Tale of Rightsowner
Overzealousness, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 27, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2011/12/umg_v_shelter c.htm)).
89. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 1, Fairey v.
Associated Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009), 2009 WL 319564.
90. See Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); see also Fox v. Hildebrand, No. CV 09-2085 DSF (VBKx), 2009 WL 1977996 (C.D. Cal.
July 1, 2009) (involving a plaintiff who argued that a copyright notice on the defendant's website
falsified copyright-management information relating to a drawing posted to the website and
defendants who claimed they intended only to copyright the website and to use the drawing to
promote the sale of real estate depicted in the drawing); Mike Mintz, Associated Press Sues News
Aggregator for Copyright Infringement, MARTINDALE.COM BLOG (Mar. 8, 2012),
http:/fblog.martindale.com/associated-press-sues-news-aggregator-for-copyright-infringement-
and-misappropriation; Matthew Williams, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: Removing
"Copyright Management Information" from Analog Copies of Works Is Prohibited by 17 USC §
1202, MITCHELL SILBERBERG & KNUPP INTELL. PROP. ALERT (July 2011),
http://www.msk.com/news/pub.cfm?id=1447.
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remove works from the public domain."91  Most artists and small
businesses will buckle under corporate pressure when facing such
claims. 9
2
The AV Treaty's moral rights could lead to endless litigation
concerning mashups and the like. We have already seen many
attempts to restrict the fair use of books, news stories, songs, music
videos, and video games in cases such as Authors Guild v. Google,
Cambridge University Press v. Becker,93 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, 94 Lenz v. Universal,95 and Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo.96
Article 6 of the AV Treaty seems to grant a broad new right to restrict
the "communication" of unfixed performances not already broadcast,
exceptions to which countries "may" but need not grant.9 7 Although
US law already has such a provision, 98  it is of dubious
constitutionality unless grounded in the Treaty Clause or some
similar grant of congressional power other than the Copyright
Clause. 99 In any event, it is arguably unconstitutional as an end run
91. John Bergmayer, The Broadcast Treaty vs. Broadcast Law, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE
(June 24, 2011), http://publicknowledge.org/bloglbroadcast-treaty-vs-broadcast-law.
92. See Liebesman & Wilson, supra note 88, at 166 ("[Mlany small businesses would
most likely choose to close shop rather than spend the energy and money required to defend
themselves against the behemoths. [For example, d]ue to the high costs of prolonged litigation,
resellers [of trademarked goods on eBay] who most likely would have a valid nominative fair use
claim may not be able defend themselves.") (citations omitted).
93. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136(DC), 2013 WL 6017130, at *8,
10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2013) (court rejected effort to restrict search engine for books, where
evidence indicated that searchability benefitted authors commercially); Cambridge Univ. Press v.
Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (court rejected effort to ban all unauthorized uses
of books posted electronically for teaching purposes); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Academic
Authors and Legal Scholars in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance at 1-2,
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, Nos. 12-14676-FF, 12-15147-FF (11th Cir. Apr. 25, 2013), 2013
WL 1869775 (describing how the lawsuit threatens education, scholarship, and knowledge).
94. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (describing allegations that
parody of song did not constitute fair use); see also Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d
1429, 1446 (6th Cir. 1992) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (warning that the case may lead to "the
prospect of the courts turning copyright holders into censors of parody"), rev'd 510 U.S. 569
(1994).
95. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152-53, 1157 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (describing copyright owner's allegations that posting a home video with copyrighted
background music to YouTube constituted infringement).
96. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting attempt to restrict fair use of video games using device that did not reproduce or
distribute them, but altered their private "performances").
97. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 6.
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
99. See United States v. Martignon (Martignon 1), 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423-24
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, (Martignon II) 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007); KISS Catalog v. Passport
Int'l Prods., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832-33 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("[The current version of the statute
creates perpetual copyright-like protection in violation of the 'for limited Times' restriction of the
Copyright Clause."). The court in Martignon I addressed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §
2319A, which is in some ways analogous to 17 U.S.C. § 1101. Martignon I, 346 F. Supp. 2d at
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around the Copyright Clause.100 Unlike the Copyright Act and Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), it does not merely apply to
"Writings" such as artworks. 10 1 The Seventh Circuit has strongly
implied that, under the Copyright Clause, federal statutes like VARA
may not protect unfixed works.
102
WIPO warns: "Digital technologies make it easy to manipulate
video images and may do so in ways that can harm an actor's
423-24. The district court noted that: "The Framers of the Constitution created a system whereby
only fixed works were entitled to Copyright protection, and Congress has honored this
interpretation of 'writings' since that time." Id. On that basis, the court held that "by virtue of
the fact that it regulates unfixed live performances, the anti-bootlegging statute is not within the
purview of Congress' Copyright Clause power." Id. at 424. The Second Circuit vacated the
decision, finding that the law was valid under Commerce Clause unless it violated the First
Amendment, but remanded "to allow the district court to consider the First Amendment
argument." Martignon II, 492 F.3d at 153.
100. See, e.g., Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-71 (1982) (Congress
could not evade limitations of Bankruptcy Clause by using Commerce Clause on related subject
matter); Martignon I, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425 n.16 ("When a specific clause of the Constitution,
such as Clause 8 of Article I, Section 8, has been construed as containing general limitations on
Congress's power, Congress may not avoid those limitations by legislating under another clause."
(quoting William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An
Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 361 (1999))); Brief of Amici
Curiae Internet Archive et al. in Support of Defendant-Appellee and Affirmance, Martignon II,
492 F.3d 140 (No. 04-5649-CR), 2005 WL 5835236 (arguing that statute regulating unauthorized
fixation of unfixed performances must be scrutinized under the Copyright and Patent Clause,
which intended limited monopolies for innovation to be uniform and to be restricted to "Writings"
in the case of expressive works); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Restraint on Congress, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1178 (2000) (opposing Commerce Clause basis for copyright-like protection
for uncopyrightable materials because Copyright and Patent Clause denies Congress power to
grant such rights).
101. Cf. Martignon I, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 421, 423 (holding that one of "central problems"
with it is "that an unrecorded live musical performance is not a writing," and noting that while
live performances may become fixed by authorizing a recording, "live musical performances of
which an artist does not authorize a recording never become fixed").
102. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 293, 304-05 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that
"the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to secure for 'authors' exclusive rights in their
'writings,"' but that a living garden is not subject to protection under VARA as a "Writing"
because its "constituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed," even though
defendant publicly described garden as "form of 'living' art" and a way "to incorporate the
landscape in artistic creation," and even though an "expert, a professor of art history, reinforced
[the] view that [the garden] was both a painting and a sculpture"). Aaron Perzanowski points out
that copyright protection for works "fixed" in transitory transmissions, such as in computer
memory for purposes of Internet transmission, is constitutionally problematic. See Aaron
Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV.1067, 1089-90 (2010). He states that as to
"copyrightability, fixation ensures compliance with this constitutional mandate," and argues that
works of transitory duration "that fail to enable the evidentiary and progress promotion
functions [of fixation] should not qualify as fixed," an issue that is becoming more relevant
because the Internet's "constant stream of instantiations of copyrighted works has outstripped
the traditional conception of the copy, one rooted in the concrete and tangible paradigm of an
enduring bound volume." Id. at 1068, 1089-90, 1096.
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reputation. ' 10 3  WIPO further states that "performers in some
countries retain moral rights to object to. . . derogatory treatment of
their performances." 10 4  Under this justification, the AV Treaty
resembles an anti-blasphemy law for actors and Hollywood. Of course,
ordinary people often will not be able to complain about being
portrayed in a derogatory way by a film or TV show. 105 That would be
censorship.
WIPO and the USPTO promise that Hollywood will be
protected because the transfer of rights from actors to producers will
be automatic, making the AV Treaty more of a producers' and
broadcasters' rights treaty. 106  Hollywood is also protected by an
103. Performers' Rights, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/enlbriefs/
performers.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
104. Id.
105. If ordinary persons are public figures due to their participation in some political
campaign or organization, they will face nearly insurmountable obstacles to recovery in a libel or
slander action. See, e.g., BRUCE D. ITULE & DOUGLAS A. ANDERSON, NEWS WRITING AND
REPORTING FOR TODAY'S MEDIA 649 (1987) ("We're dealing with a peculiar law of actual malice
which makes it almost impossible for a public figure to prove .... Clearly, it is not enough for a
public figure to show that a media defendant carelessly published a defamatory or false
[statement] ....... ); Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on
Communications Law, Punitive Damages in Libel Actions, 42 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 64 (1987) (noting "the 'almost impossible level' of the
actual malice burden of proof at trial, regardless of how well-financed" the plaintiff may be). This
was not an accidental development on the broadcasters' part. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File
Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Broadcasters at 3-4, 8, Miami Herald Publ'g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (No. 73-797), 1974 WL 185866 (arguing, successfully as it
turned out, that persons other than actors and musicians should not have a "right of reply"
against criticisms of them in the media because: "An affirmative requirement may still constitute
a form of censorship and, more importantly, it may impose a 'chilling effect' upon the free
exercise of First Amendment rights .... [R]estraints upon the free exercise of First Amendment
rights bear a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity."); Motion for Leave to File
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. at 4, 9, Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (No. 86-1278), 1987 WL 881313 ("Harsh criticism or
personal revelations in the media" should not be actionable unless there is a malicious falsehood,
even though such revelations "may undoubtedly hurt or cause embarrassment or even emotional
distress," because '"[the most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a
deliberate or reckless untruth."' (quoting Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974))); id. at 11-12 ("[T]his Court has warned that
liability based on 'defendant's hatred, ill-will or desire to injure [is] clearly impermissible
absent"' proof of "an intention to harm through falsehood." (quoting Old Dominion Branch No.
496, 418 U.S. at 281)); see also Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press et al. in Support of the Appellant at 14, Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (No. 87-
329) 1988 WL 1026323, at *14 ("Florida's interest in prohibiting the publication of a rape victim's
name does not outweigh the First Amendment right of the news media to publish publicly
available information."); id. at 19 ("In [Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co.], 443 U.S. 97 (1978), this
Court ruled that a statute . . . was unconstitutional. West Virginia made it a misdemeanor for
newspapers to publish the names of juvenile offenders without obtaining prior written approval
from the juvenile court.").
106. See USPTO, Summary of WIPO AVP Treaty, supra note 15, at 2 ('With the now
acceptable 'transfer of rights' provisions, the AVP Treaty represents a win-win for labor and
industry, allowing them to work even more closely in fighting global piracy. Ratification ... will
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Agreed Statement to Article 5, providing that "modifications of a
performance that are made in the normal course of exploitation of the
performance, such as editing, compression, dubbing, or formatting, in
existing or new media or formats, and that are made in the course of a
use authorized by the performer, would not in themselves amount to
modifications within the meaning of Article 5(1)(ii)."1°7 Thus, actors'
and directors' traditional objections to unflattering editing, the cutting
of performances, and translation to lower-quality images may still fail.
Under WIPO's influence, American copyright infringement,
which generally requires a volitional act that copies, distributes, or
transmits a work to another person,108 or that knowingly assists or
directly profits from authorizing such an act, 109 could someday morph
into the vague "use" right envisioned by Javier Bardem. 110 This
appears to be the purpose of Articles 5, 6, and 12 of the AV Treaty,
Articles 5, 6, 10, and 19 of the WPPT, and Articles 4.10(a)(iii), 5 and
12.4 of the TPP.111 Redefining the mere "making available" of a work
as a violation of exclusive rights, as these articles of the AV Treaty
give U.S. stakeholders another mechanism to promote protection of the intellectual property in
their films."); Press Release, WIPO Beijing Treaty Concluded, supra note 33.
107. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 5.
108. See CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that
direct copyright liability "requires conduct by a person who causes in some meaningful way an
infringement"); id. at 551 (finding that "a system that automatically transmits users' material
but is itself totally indifferent to the material's content" does not cause infringement in a
meaningful way); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497-99 (E.D. Pa. 2006) ("When an
ISP automatically and temporarily stores data without human intervention so that the system
can operate and transmit data to its users, the necessary element of volition is missing. The
automatic activity of Google's search engine is analogous. It is clear that Google's automatic
archiving of USENET postings and excerpting of websites in its results to users' search queries
do not include the necessary volitional element to constitute direct copyright infringement.");
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-70 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) ("[T]he mere fact that [the ISP's] system incidentally makes temporary copies of
plaintiffs' works does not mean [the ISP] has caused the copying. The court believes that [the
ISP's] act of designing or implementing a system that automatically and uniformly creates
temporary copies of all data sent through it is not unlike that of the owner of a copying machine
who lets the public make copies with it .... Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there
should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant's system
is merely used to create a copy by a third party.").
109. See Flava Works, Inc. v. Clavio, No. 11 C 05100, 2012 WL 2459146, at *3-5 (N.D.
Ill. June 27, 2012); Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, No. 10 C 6517, 2011 WL 1791557, at *3-6 (N.D.
Ill. May 10, 2011).
110. See supra text accompanying note 30.
111. See AV Treaty, supra note 19, arts. 5, 6, 12 (expanding performers' moral, economic,
and transfer rights); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty arts. 5, 6, 10, 19, Dec. 20,
1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 245 (1997) (expanding performers' moral,
economic, and transfer rights); TPP vs US Law, supra note 39 (discussing articles 4.10(a)(iii), 5,
and 12.4 of the TPP); Hanley, supra note 7, at 191, 200 (citing Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement Final; Group Calls Process 'Unconstitutional,' 81 PAT., TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT J.
72 (2010), available at http://www.bna.com/anticounterfeiting-trade-agreement-n6476).
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and the WPPT do, and making the violation subject to statutory
damages, as the TPP does, will deter Internet remixes of
performances. If making sounds or images available violates the
distribution right, millions of Americans will be potentially liable for
ordinary Internet activities. If, on the other hand, actual downloads of
copies of the sounds or images are required to show a distribution,
users will less often be liable.
112
The AV Treaty also hampers preservation efforts by extending
the term of protection for performances to 50 years, which is an
eternity in Internet time. Lack of preservation is a crisis in the
television industry-a report for the Library of Congress concluded
that "extensive and irretrievable losses have occurred in the past....
For most local television news footage from the late 1940's to the
1970's it is already too late to do anything. Programs were just not
recorded and millions of feet of film clips and outtakes were
destroyed."'1 3 As we transition to digital TV production, the losses
will be worse. The computer library service OCLC warns: "The
fragility of digital storage media, combined with a high degree of
technology dependence, considerably shortens the 'grace period'
during which preservation decisions can be deferred .... The digital
files produced by public television are very large, complex, and come in
multiple formats."
11 4
The AV Treaty provides that there shall be "effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological
measures that are used by performers in connection with the exercise
of their rights under this Treaty and that restrict [unlawful] acts."1 1
5
An Agreed Statement to the treaty claims that "producers, service
providers, and persons engaged in communication or broadcasting
using performances on the basis of due authorization" will enjoy legal
remedies against interference with TPMs. 116  The parties with
standing to sue for circumvention could multiply wildly. Thus, one of
the AV Treaty's most important effects is to reinforce the process by
which producers prohibit fair use of films and television by wrapping
them in technological shackles that inhibit quotation and mashups.
112. Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright's Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to
Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 1, 1 (2011).
113. See 1 WILLIAM T. MURPHY, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, TELEVISION AND VIDEO
PRESERVATION 1997: A REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN TELEVISION AND VIDEO
PRESERVATION (1997), available at http://www.loc.gov/filmltvstudy.html.
114. YVONNE NG ET AL., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABLE
PRESERVATION OF BORN DIGITAL PUBLIC TELEVISION 15-16 (2010), available at
https://www.prestocentre.org/system/files/library/resource/PDPTV-SustainabilityStrategies.pdf.
115. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 15.
116. Id.
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Revising copyright law to declare "making available" a distribution,
and to prohibit the removal of copyright-management information
from a performance, will have a chilling effect on fair use.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON NEW RIGHTS FOR PERFORMERS
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that copyright
law was subject to First Amendment challenges, but that parties may
only file such challenges when new copyright provisions alter the
"traditional contours" of copyright.
117
A. Article 5
Article 5 of the AV Treaty alters the traditional contours of
copyright.118 Pamela Samuelson has argued that European-style
"intellectual property protection" is "a policy that has no counterpart
in US law," in part because the US "motion picture industry has
opposed granting moral rights to creative contributors of motion
pictures, including performers."'1 19
The 1790 Copyright Act did not cover audible and audiovisual
works, and it only protected books, maps, and charts against
"printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending," rather than nonliteral
or partial literal appropriation. 120 Under the 1831 Copyright Act,
copyright infringement included printing, publishing, and importing
books and some other works, but it did not confer a "property [right] in
[an author's] original conceptions," such as characters or scenes,
because others were free to use those conceptions in "the composition
of a new work."
121
117. For a discussion, see Michael Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275 (2003) (rev. 2008); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2008), available at
http://www.thepublicdomain.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/thepublicdomain.html; see also
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1156 (2009)
(reviewing NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (2008)).
118. See AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 12; see also Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d
14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) ("American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral
rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the
economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors.").
119. Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 371
nn.13, 15 (1997). Jessica Litman concurs, stating that "[w]ith the narrow exceptions of painters
and sculptors, American authors have no enforceable attribution or integrity rights." Jessica
Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1382 (2010).
120. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).
121. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853); see Act of Feb. 8, 1831,
ch. 16, § 4, 4 Stat. 436, 437 (repealed 1870).
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It took until the late nineteenth century for such
derivative-work rights to gain acceptance in the courts. 122 By 1909,
copyright infringement had extended to the public performance of a
written drama, the dramatization or translation of a story, the
conversion of a written drama into a novel, the arrangement or
adaptation of a musical work, or the completion of a work of art using
an existing model or design.
123
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, the copyright owner enjoys the
right to prepare derivative works, and to limit the performance of
plays or musical compositions. 124 The derivative-work right, however,
does not prohibit de minimis distortions, works that are dissimilar
overall, or the fair use of a work that denies the rights holder some of
his or her normal licensing revenue-each of which the AV Treaty
purports to restrict in some way or other.125 Derivative-work lawsuits
122. See Voegtli, supra note 2, at 1235; Christina Bohannan, Taming the Derivative
Works Right: A Modest Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669, 690 (2010); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, F(r)ee Expression? Reconciling
Copyright and the First Amendment, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 863, 876-77 (2007).
123. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (repealed 1976); see also
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393-94 (1968) (citing
Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, as amended, 17 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.), superseded by statute,
Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, as recognized in Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 n.16 (9th Cir.
1979) ("A copyright proprietor has an exclusive monopoly over all uses of the protected work,
including the right to copy, print, vend, publish, make other versions of, perform or exhibit the
work." (citing Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1, 35 Stat. 1075)); Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20
("Section 7 of the Copyright Law [of 1909] provide[d] in part that 'adaptations, arrangements,
dramatizations.., or other versions of... copyrighted works when produced with the consent of
the proprietor of the copyright in such works . . . shall be regarded as new works subject to
copyright...."'); P.C. Films Corp. v. MGM/UA Home Video Inc., 138 F.3d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1998)
("Under the Copyright Act of 1909, a transfer of anything less than the totality of rights
commanded by copyright was automatically a license rather than an assignment the copyright..
• . [An agreement might transfer] the right to distribute, as well as various other incidental
rights, while retaining other copyright rights, such as novelization and sequelization rights.").
124. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
125. See Lil' Joe Wein Music, Inc. v. Jackson, 245 F. App'x 873, 880 (11th Cir. 2007)
(holding that although the initial section of the defendant's song "prominently" used the
plaintiffs allegedly copyrighted musical phrase, the use was de minimis because "the 'average
lay observer' would not confuse the two works" as a whole); Tufamerica, Inc. v. Diamond, No. 12
Civ. 3529(AJN), 2013 WL 4830954, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013) (holding that where the
defendant's song used a three-second sample from the plaintiffs song along with allegedly
"distinctive shouted lyrics," no infringement was plausible because the lyrical phrase was not
used in "the title of the song [or] repeated emphatically at various points in the recording");
Poindexter v. EMI Record Grp. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 559(LTS)(JLC), 2012 WL 1027639, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012) (holding that the use of a single note from the plaintiffs work in new
work was de minimis); Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338 (S.D. Fla.
2009) (holding that where an allegedly "distinctive" and "memorable" vocal sequence was
sampled in the defendant's song, use was de minimis because the parties' songs had "different
lyrical content, tempo, rhythms, and arrangements"); Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the use of the plaintiff's pinball
machine in seconds-long excerpts in the background of a three-and-a-half minute scene in the
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have failed even against such systematic borrowings as the Greatest
American Hero, in which an ordinary man develops nearly all of
Superman's powers, or The Wind Done Gone, a commentary on and
derivative of Gone with the Wind.126 As the Second Circuit stated in
1964: "[C]ourts in passing upon particular claims of infringement
must occasionally subordinate the copyright-holder's interest in a
defendant's film was de minimis because the machine was "not elevated into any prominence" in
the scene); Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., No. 00 CIV 4022(DC), 2002 WL 287786, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
27, 2002) (holding that the use of a three-note sequence along with the words "Clap Your Hands"
was not infringing where the parties' "songs, taken as a whole, [were] substantially different");
Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1046, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that where the plaintiffs sculptural work product was displayed in the defendant's film
in a "fleeting and impermanent" way, it was not an infringing derivative work even though
display lasted for "approximately one minute and thirty-six seconds"). But see Greenberg v. Nat'l
Geographic Soc'y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled by 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir.
2001) (holding that where the National Geographic Society and the co-developer of a CD-ROM
utilized the plaintiffs work in way that was "both qualitatively and quantitatively significant,"
they infringed on the derivative-work right and the use was not de minimis); Ringgold v. Black
Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the use of 80 percent of
the plaintiffs copyrighted work for its cultural significance in more than 26 seconds of the
defendant's work was not de minimis and could infringe); Williams v. Broadus, No. 99 Civ. 10957
MBM, 2001 WL 984714, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2001) (holding that a new song taking a small
number of notes from a prior song, and replaying them throughout, could infringe).
126. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001)
(requiring evidence that a book based upon a prior book have encapsulated the prior book by
using the "very same copyrighted characters, settings, and plot" before concluding that there was
substantial similarity between them, and going on to find that the new book likely made fair use
of the prior book); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241-43 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that a character in a television series who had many of the powers of Superman, the
comic-book and film hero, did not result in the infringement of the character copyright because
the television series character acted differently on his "missions" than Superman would have,
but noting that "lack of substantial similarity is not a complete answer to a Lanham Act claim,
since a second comer can violate section 43(a) by falsely representing his goods as those of the
trademark owner"); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Civ. No. C78-679A, 1981 WL 1402,
at *6-10 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (holding that defendant who created sexually-suggestive
illustration of plaintiffs copyrighted Pillsbury dough-people characters did not make unfair use
of characters where defendant intended a "social commentary" on the characters and there was
no proof that defendant "intended to fill the demand for the original or that its presentation had
this effect"). See also Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience
Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 1004 (1999) (describing a fundamental shift in trademark
analysis). Justin Hughes observed,
[11n Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., the court moved from
a standard trademark analysis-consumer beliefs about source of a product-to a more
interesting thought about 'corrupting' an idea: Defendants assert that the Lanham
Act requires confusion as to the origin of the film .... Appellants read the confusion
requirement too narrowly. In order to be confused, a consumer need not believe that
the owner of the mark actually produced the item and placed it on the market. The
public's belief that the mark's owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the
trademark satisfies the confusion requirement.
Id. (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., 604 F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1979)).
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maximum financial return to the greater public interest in the
development of art, science and industry."1 27
The Copyright Act contains other provisions that subordinate
the author's right to control the "use" of a work to the interests of
other authors in reusing a work. While a cover artist may not avail
himself or herself of a compulsory license in order to alter the basic
melody or fundamental character of a song, the law seems to tolerate
substantial variation, and the licensing rate for a cover is only 9.1
cents per copy. 128  The Copyright Act of 1976 starkly limited
performance rights "to permit garage bands and other musicians the
right to record cover versions of their favorite songs without the
songwriter's permission" and "to permit cable and satellite companies
to retransmit network television programming without prior consent
of the copyright owners." 129 Such provisions are important to "prevent
the formation of oppressive monopolies, which might be founded upon
the very rights granted to the composer for the purpose of protecting
his interests."130
The most recent change in US copyright law that compares to
the AV Treaty is the transition following US implementation of the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(Berne Convention) from the pre-Berne 1976 Act to the post-Berne
framework, including VARA. The limited collective coverage of the
Berne Convention and VARA and the no-expansion-of-rights clause in
the Berne Convention Implementation Act resulted in more modest
changes than the AV Treaty entails.1 31 When the United States joined
the Berne Convention in 1989,132 Congress chose to perpetuate
127. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966)
(quoting Berlin v. E. C. Publ'n, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964)); see also Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 89 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S.
376 (1975).
128. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012); FAQ, LIMELIGHT, https://www.songclearance.com/
faq (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). For the difficulties faced by cover song video authors who upload
to YouTube, see Andy Baio, Criminal Creativity: Untangling Cover Song Licensing on YouTube,
WIRED (May 2, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://www.wired.comfbusiness/2012/05/opinion-baio-criminal-
creativity; Posting Cover Songs on YouTube: Music Licensing Law Explained, D1Y MUSICIAN
BLOG (Mar. 28, 2012), http://diymusician.cdbaby.com20l2/03/on-posting-cover-songs-on-youtube-
music-licensing-law-explained.
129. Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO STATE L.J. 1361, 1402 (2009).
130. H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 7 (1909).
131. Cf. Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual
Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 339 (2004) (noting that Berne Convention was
"modest" in scope of rights guaranteed to authors).
132. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, revised at Paris
July 24, 1971, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ipfberne/trtdocs_ wo001.html.
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limitations on moral rights provided by US common law, state
statutes, the Copyright and Lanham Acts, and the VARA proposal.
133
The Berne Convention Implementation Act states that: "Any rights in
a work eligible for protection under this title that derive from this
title, other Federal or State statutes, or the common law, shall not be
expanded or reduced by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of
the Berne Convention, or the adherence of the United States
thereto."'134 As the Berne Convention merged with trade law in 1994,
the United States demanded that TRIPS not include moral rights that
would be contrary to US law. 35 Although WIPO's Director General
reassured Congress that US law did not need to change, 136 scholars
have noted that US copyright law has traditional contours that deny
the moral rights contemplated by Berne.
1 37
133. The Berne Convention's Moral Rights Clause states: "Independently of the author's
economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of,
or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor
or reputation." Id. art. 6bis(1).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2012) (codifying Berne Convention Implementation Act (BCIA) §
3, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)).
135. See Ruth L. Okediji, Through the Years: The Supreme Court and the Copyright
Clause, 30 WM. MITCHELLL. REV. 1633, 1651 (2004).
136. Seth Tipton points out that the WIPO Director-General concurred in the assessment
by Congress that amendments to the Copyright Act were not needed to enact the Berne
Convention. See Seth Tipton, Note, Connoisseurship Corrected: Protecting the Artist, the Public
and the Role of Art Museums Through the Amendment of VARA, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 269, 289-90
& n. 169 (2009). Tipton quotes Dr. Arpad Borgsch, the Director General of WIPO, opining that:
[I]t is not necessary for the United States of America to enact statutory provisions on
moral rights in order to comply with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. The
requirements . . . can be fulfilled not only by statutory provisions in a copyright
statute but also by the common law and other statutes. I believe that in the United
States the common law and such statutes (Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act) contain
the necessary law to fulfill any obligation under Article 6bis.
Id. at n.169 (quoting The Berne Convention: Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong
323 (1988) (letter of Arpad Bogsch to Irwin Karp, Chairman of the National Convention, June 16,
1987)).
137. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 37 (2012) (noting that "we may not be in compliance with our
obligations under the Berne Convention"); MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT
LAW 393 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that "VARA falls short of conforming to the requirements of the
Berne Convention" by terminating moral rights before the expiration of economic rights); DAVID
NIMMER, COPYRIGHT ILLUMINATED: REFOCUSING THE DIFFUSE U.S. STATUTE 445 & n.108, 469
(2008) (noting that excepting 6bis of the Berne Convention from enforcement under the TRIPS
protocol "casts doubt on the bona fides of the United States in world copyright circles" and
invites charges that the United States "is failing to comply with some very important Berne
provisions"); Graeme W. Austin, The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights
After Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 111, 116-18 (2005) (highlighting the House Judiciary
Committee's insistence that "adherence of the United States to the Berne Convention did not in
itself expand or reduce any right of an author to claim authorship of the work or to object to a
work's derogatory treatment"); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global
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In ratifying the Berne Convention, Congress drew attention to
the Lanham Act and state laws respecting the right of publicity,
breach of contract, defamation, fraud, misrepresentation, and unfair
competition. 138 The Lanham Act does not cover the authorship of
performances, 139 and the right of publicity and the common law of
misappropriation typically do not prohibit noncommercial use of a
performance, such as in artistic expression, journalism, or
scholarship.1 40 Major centers of audiovisual production, including
California, Florida, New York, and Texas, allow the noncommercial
use of performances. 141 An expansion of moral rights to potentially
Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 HOuS. L.
REV. 1187, 1209 (2009) ('The United States, for instance, did not join the Berne Convention until
1988, and it never fully complied with all of its requirements (which is why Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention was excluded from TRIPS)."); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim
Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 281 (2004) (asking
about US claims that existing law already covered the article 6bis rights in light of their
exclusion from TRIPS sanctions, "Were we fibbing? Some would say 'Yes,'... ); Justin Hughes,
American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar "Gap," 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 661 (2007) ('The
Dastar ruling was unquestionably important for a robust public domain, but the reasoning the
Court employed makes American compliance with Article 6bis considerably more problematic.");
Tyler T. Ochoa, 1984 and Beyond: Two Decades of Copyright Law, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 167, 181 n.116 (2003) ('The exception concerning Article 6bis was insisted upon
by the United States, for the obvious reason that we knew we were not in full compliance with
Article 6bis."). See generally Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23
(2003).
138. See Hughes, American Moral Rights, supra note 136, at 660-62, 665-66.
139. See S. REP. No. 1333-79, at 3 (1946) (noting that the Lanham Act is concerned with
the source of goods); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11,
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428), 2003 WL
544536 ("Quite unlike copyright or patent law, the Lanham Act is not designed to reward
innovation or encourage invention, but instead to protect the public from confusion as to the
source of goods."); Hughes, American Moral Rights, supra note 136, at 661 (noting that the
Supreme Court has confirmed that the Lanham Act is concerned with the source of goods); see
also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra, at 10 (Congress
compared Berne Convention with Lanham Act upon ratifying the former, and as a result of
implementing legislation, "the [Berne] Convention is 'not self-executing under the Constitution
and laws of the United States,' and the United States' adherence to the Convention does 'not
expand or reduce any right of an author of a work ... to claim authorship of the work' under
existing domestic law." (quoting BCIA, § 3, 102 Stat. at 2853 and citing Berne Convention, 828
U.N.T.S. at 235, 251)); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra, at 21 (arguing against reading "a specialized right of attribution for the authors of artistic
works" into the Lanham Act).
140. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a), (d) (2012).
141. See id. (requiring that the use of a celebrity's image or likeness be "for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services,
without such person's prior consent," and exempts by statute the "use of a name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports
broadcast or account, or any political campaign"); Weil v. Johnson, No. 119431/02, 2002 WL
31972157, at *3-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 2002) (explaining that although New York lacks a
common-law right of publicity, its Civil Rights Law protects a person's name, portrait, picture, or
voice against use in "advertising" or "trade," provisions which are "narrowly construed and
strictly limited to nonconsensual commercial appropriations of the name, portrait or picture of a
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prohibit noncommercial uses of performances through the AV Treaty
is undesirable.
The Department of Commerce report that led to the DMCA
suggested that "serious Constitutional questions" about moral rights
exist under the Copyright Clause.1 42 The justification that they are
necessary to promote the progress of science and useful arts is lacking
given our country's creative productivity without them.1 43  This
productivity has a history stretching back to the performance of
Spanish and Native American plays in the seventeenth century and
the publication of John Smith's history of colonial Virginia early in the
seventeenth century.144 More recently, the remarkable outpouring of
performances on YouTube and other websites suggests that even
without performers' rights, Americans will still perform music, skits,
speeches, and parodies.
Moral rights, as defined by VARA, only extend to the
intentional alteration of a work of visual art or the intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of a work of recognized stature in the art
world. VARA only protects paintings, sculptures, and "still
photographic image[s] produced for exhibition purposes
living person."). But cf. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2010); Kirby v.
Sega of America, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Krista Correa, All Your
Face Are Belong to Us: Protecting Celebrity Images in Hyper-Realistic Video Games, 34 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 93, 109-10 (2011); John Gillison, Recent Development, California's Right of
Publicity Undergoes a Significant Transformation: Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 362 (2002). Mark Lemley points out that "[a] celebrity
(and presumably even an ordinary mortal) can use the right of publicity to control not only the
use of her name, but also her picture, voice, and overall image." Lemley, supra note 9, at 899
(citing McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1994) (involving an actor); White v.
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving an actor); Waits v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving a singer); Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1988) (involving a singer)).
142. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 146 (1995) [hereinafter, USPTO, NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE].
143. Aaron K. Perzanowski reproduces the following excerpt from a treatise concerning
the traditional contours of US copyright protection:
It would seem that a copy involves the conception that it must have some degree of
permanency or the maxim de minimis would apply. Thus, while the making of a single
copy may be infringement, if this copy were destroyed almost as soon as made, as, for
example, if a vaudeville artist drew with colored chalks, or if a verse were cast upon a
screen through a stereopticon, it may be doubted whether such a temporary
production could fairly be called a copy.
Perzanowski, supra note 102, at 1091 n.132 (quoting ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT
LAW 406 (1917)).
144. See, e.g., Mexican-American Theater, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS'N, http://www.tshaonline.
orgfhandbooklonline/articles/kkmvs (last visited Oct. 31, 2013); John Smith Assumes Presidency
of Jamestown, AM. MEMORY, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/seplO.html (last visited Oct.
31, 2013).
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only"-probably because other photographic images are routinely
modified and mutilated as part of normal, let alone avant garde or
transgressive, artistic and journalistic practice. 145 The House Report
to VARA stated that moral rights in the United States should be
limited to visual art intended for exhibitions and "created in single
copies or in limited editions."1 46 The Copyright Office described VARA
as reflecting the fact that "Congress for the first time legislated
limited moral rights of attribution and integrity to authors of narrowly
defined works of visual arts."147 The rights created are "personal to
the artist" and last only as long as his or her lifetime, a limitation that
distinguishes these moral rights from other US intellectual property
protections.
148
The Register of Copyrights has warned that moral rights
legislation requires judges to act as arbiters of artistic quality contrary
to American traditions.149 During the 1980s, Congress also declined to
amend the Lanham Act to prohibit "omission of material information"
as to authorship from products or advertising, because this presented
a problem of compelled speech as to all material facts and "raised
difficult questions [of] freedom of speech."'50 In the 1990s, Congress
failed to pass the Film Disclosure Act, which would have required
labeling of films to reflect editing of the performances therein in later
editions.' 15 The act stalled due to opposition from the Motion Picture
Association of America, the ACLU, and the Department of
Commerce. 152 The ACLU described the bill as a "form of censorship"
under the First Amendment. 15 3 A Commerce Department report noted
145. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012).
146. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 6919 (1990).
147. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VISUAL ARTWORKS:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1996) [hereinafter WAIVER], available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/
exsum.html; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
(1995), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-1995.pdf.
148. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 139,
at 20 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b), (d), (e) (2012)).
149. See, e.g., Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 1619 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 21 (1987)
(statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
150. Brief for Petitioners at 35 & n.38, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428), 2003 WL 367729 (citations omitted).
151. See Honicky, supra note 24, at 425.
152. See id. at 428; see also The Film Disclosure Act: Hearing on H.R. 1248 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995)
(statement of Jeffrey Eves, President, Video Software Dealers Association); The Film Disclosure
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102 Cong. 72-73 (1993) [hereinafter Film Disclosure Act Hearing] (statement of
Robert Peck, ACLU).
153. Film Disclosure Act Hearing, supra note 151, at 71; see also Honicky, supra note 24,
at 428 n.143.
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that moral rights that are "non-waivable may create difficulties for the
commercialization of works in the [Internet] environment. '" 154 A
Japanese report on multimedia copyright and related rights reached a
similar conclusion.
155
The AV Treaty also alters the contours of copyright known to
WIPO. The WCT did not extend moral rights to computer programs,
electronic rights-management information, or TPMs. 156  The
negotiators of the WCT also refused to provide that a company could
be liable for negligently providing facilities to a person who transmits
a remix of a protected performance with the original credits removed
or altered, which is what Article 16 of the AV Treaty aspires to do.
157
Although the WPPT recognized moral rights, the negotiators omitted
the audiovisual world from it.158 According to Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
this was because the United States could not agree with Europe on the
154. USPTO, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 142, at 146.
155. Id.
156. There is no counterpart to Article 5 of the AV Treaty in the WCT. See WIPO
Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 ("Contracting Parties shall apply mutatis
mutandis the provisions of Articles 2 to 6 of the Berne Convention in respect of the protection
provided for in this Treaty."). Moral rights appear in Article 6bis of Berne, which is distinct from
and appears after Article 6.
157. Although the WCT contains a similar provision, it is limited to "electronic rights
management information" (in other words, not to analog credits or other rights management
boilerplate) and to those who distribute, import, broadcast, or directly communicate to the public
(and not simply by providing facilities for enabling or making a communication) a work from
which it is known that "electronic rights management information" have been removed without
authority. See id.; Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The Never-Ending Struggle for Balance,
COMMC'NS ACM, May 1997, at 19 (addressing interpretations that "reject[] the idea that merely
providing facilities for transmission of digital works should be the basis for liability."). The WCT
specifically provides that:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate and effective legal remedies against any
person knowingly performing any of the following acts knowing, or with respect to
civil remedies having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable,
facilitate or conceal an infringement of any right covered by this Treaty or the Berne
Convention: (i) to remove or alter any electronic rights management information
without authority; (ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broadcast or communicate
to the public, without authority, works or copies of works knowing that electronic
rights management information has been removed or altered without authority.
Id. art. 12. It also presents the understanding that "the mere provision of physical facilities for
enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the
meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention .. .[and] that nothing in Article 8 precludes a
Contracting Party from applying Article 1 lbis(2)." Id. art. 8 & n.7.
158. WPPT, supra note 15, art. 5(1) ("Independently of a performer's economic rights,
and even after the transfer of those rights, the performer shall, as regards his live aural
performances or performances fixed in phonograms, have the right to claim to be identified as
the performer of his performances, except where omission is dictated by the manner of the use of
the performance, and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his
performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation.").
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language and Europe believed that a treaty without US participation
was not useful.
159
The Supreme Court has struck down a number of laws on the
basis that they were overbroad, insofar as they applied by their literal
terms to protected works of artistic, cultural, or political expression. 160
A similar analysis would raise grave concerns about the AV Treaty's
constitutionality. Its literal terms would create even more ambiguous
and unpredictable liability than the laws struck down by the Supreme
Court in Citizens United v. FEC or ACLU v. Reno.
16
1
Consider a claim by Mitt Romney against CNN or MSNBC for
using his performance at a private fundraiser in which he referred to
the "47 percent" who are dependent on government and who believe
that they are entitled to food. 162 Article 2 defines a performer to
include those who "declaim" a "literary" work or works.1 63 Romney's
declamation of his speech would be a performance.1 64 Romney would
have the exclusive right to record his unrecorded declamation of his
presentation to his donors. By quoting it out of context, the Obama
campaign would be altering and mutilating it.165 The "classic
definition" of performers defines them to include those who "declaim"
159. Graeme Dinwoodie, The WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Transition to the Future of
International Copyright Lawmaking?, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 751, 763 n.46 (2007).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 476, 482 (2010) (holding that the
section of the US Code banning the sale for commercial gain of depictions of cruelty to animals,
originally entitled Punishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty Act, violated First Amendment
because it might apply to "hunting television programs, videos, and Web sites"); Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 364, 371-72 (2010) (holding that the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 § 316, 2 U.S.C. § 441b, violated First Amendment because it might apply
to "a blog post expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate if that blog were created
with corporate funds," and noting that "[mlodern day movies, television comedies, or skits on
Youtube.com might portray public officials or public policies in unflattering ways. Yet if a
covered transmission during the blackout period creates the background for candidate
endorsement or opposition, a felony occurs solely because a corporation, other than an exempt
media corporation, has made the 'purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift
of money or anything of value' in order to engage in political speech." (quoting 2 U.S.C. §
431(9)(A)(i) (2012))); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 247-48 (2002) (holding that
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 violated the First Amendment because it might
apply to director Baz Luhrmann's version of Romeo and Juliet, Oscar Best Picture nominee
Traffic, and Oscar Best Picture winner American Beauty, films that also portray teenagers
having sex); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 856 (1997) (holding that the Communications Decency
Act section prohibiting communications to minors of indecent material violated the First
Amendment because it might apply to "newsgroups and chat rooms containing discussions of art,
politics, or other subjects that potentially elicit 'indecent' or 'patently offensive' contributions").
161. See AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 5.
162. See Mother Jones Sees Record Traffic from Mitt Romney Video, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/18/mother-jones-mitt-romney-traffic_n_
1894609.html.
163. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 2.
164. See id.
165. See id. art. 5.
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a "literary" work or works. 166 Romney's speech would arguably be a
literary work under the I Have a Dream speech decision 167 and Harper
& Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, among others.
168
Moral rights could also be applied retroactively to works
created prior to the AV Treaty's ratification, such as Romney's
speech. 169 If Congress adopts a framework for the AV Treaty similar
to the Uruguay Round Amendments Act of 1994, performers may be
able to send a notice to those who relied upon the absence of
performers' rights in US law when creating their own work.1 70 After
performers send notice, those who relied upon the absence of such
rights may have to cease distributing or performing their own work
after one year.171 Similarly, creators of derivative works may in turn
be enjoined from exploiting their own works unless they pay what the
performer believes to be reasonable compensation.
172
A defender of the TPP or the AV Treaty might respond that
Congress would have to act before Americans could face civil liability
or criminal charges for their YouTube videos or other remixes, but the
federal government has been seizing websites that do not themselves
infringe copyrights. 173 The fear is that the many vague clauses in
166. See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations art. 3(a), Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43.
167. See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1216-17 (11th
Cir. 1999).
168. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582-83 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Joseph Beck, Flexibility in Parody of Copyrighted Material, 10 MEDIA
L. & POL'Y 3, 3-6 (2003).
169. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Intellectual Property
Provisions: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. & Judicial Admin. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 85 (1994) (statement of Xavier Becerra, Member, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary) ("[Retroactivity ... is probably the best way to ensure that some of our older
American works, anything from Motown, to 'Star Trek,' to 'The Hardy Boys' get the protection in
... emerging foreign markets. It is important to ensure that countries no longer use our U.S. law
as an excuse for not extending retroactive copyright protections to some of our own works.").
170. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000)).
171. See id.
172. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A)-(B) (2012); Brief for the Motion Picture Association of
America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012)
(No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3561888 (citing these provisions and discussing them).
173. The Cybersecurity Partnership Between the Private Sector and Our Government:
Protecting Our National and Economic Security: Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp. and the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th
Cong. 6 (2013) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, Department of Homeland Security) (stating
that more than 2,000 domain names related to counterfeiting have been seized); Amici Curiae
Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of Petitioner at 1-15, 19-20, Puerto 80
Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11-3390-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 23, 2011), 2011 WL 5909020
(arguing that the United States, in violation of the First Amendment, seized domain names that
had been adjudicated to be noninfringing by a court); cf. Michael Kelley, Kim Dotcom Is Basking
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treaties such as the TPP, ACTA, or the AV Treaty will lead to the end
of the Internet as we know it. Internet companies could be forced to
edit out the quotation of copyrighted material, and the state could
inspect all Internet traffic. Executive power has tended, in recent




As noted in Part II, the AV Treaty creates an "exclusive right of
authorizing the making available to the public of . . .performances
fixed in audiovisual fixations, by wire or wireless means."175 The
Copyright Acts of 1790, 1831, and 1909 provided no such right.176
Indeed, the Act of 1909 did not even contain a performance right that
covered transmissions of a sound recording over the radio or that
could cover a transmission of a television program over a cable wire. 177
in Another Significant Legal Victory Over the US Government, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 31, 2013,
4:34 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/kim-dotcom-wins-another-legal-victory-2013-5
(suggesting that 22 million emails were seized for one case, and quoting Kim Dotcom,
Megaupload chief and target of the investigation, as arguing that he has won Canadian,
German, and New Zealand "[c]ourt rulings in favor of #Megaupload" and reporting a ruling by a
New Zealand judge that the raid on Dotcom's computers was "miscarriage of justice"); Judge
Rules Seized Items to Be Returned to Dotcom, TVNZ (May 31, 2013, 4:02 PM),
http://tvnz.co.nz/national-news/judge-rules-seized-items-returned-dotcom-5453027 (reporting
ruling by a New Zealand judge that the raid on Dotcom's computers was illegal and that the
cloned hard-drives with personal information on them should be returned to him).
174. See Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn, The Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless
NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential Power and the Injury to the Fourth Amendment, 15
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 147, 149 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power on Steroids,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB113980208779772206; see also GENE HEALY, THE CULT OF THE PRESIDENCY: AMERICA'S
DANGEROUS DEVOTION TO EXECUTIVE POWER 199 (2009); DANA D. NELSON, BAD FOR DEMOCRACY:
HOW THE PRESIDENCY UNDERMINES THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE 3 (2008); GARY WILLS, BOMB
POWER: THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 1-4 (2011).
175. AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 10.
176. See H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 10-11 (1995).
177. Id. ('The historic lack of a performance right for sound recordings under U.S.
copyright law has been a source of controversy for decades .... Sound recordings were first
granted Federal copyright protection by amendment to the Copyright Act in 1971."); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 394 n.9, 401-02 (1968) (holding that
transmission over cable system did not "perform" a work under Copyright Act of 1909 because
"[w]e take the Copyright Act of 1909 as we find it," even though that Act defined it as an
infringement "to make or to procure the making of any transcription or record [of a work] by or
from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed,
represented, produced, or reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it
in any manner or by any method whatsoever," or in the case of a musical composition, "to make
any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of
record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or
reproduced" (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1968))), superseded by statute, Copyright Revision Act of 1976,
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Moreover, "[p]rior to 1994, there was no federal protection extended to
unrecorded live musical performances. A [fan] could record a live
musical performance, and distribute copies without any authorization
from the performers, and would not have violated copyright law."
178
Although the Copyright Act of 1976 faintly echoed the "making
available" right by referring to the authorization of a distribution as a
"distribution," it did not codify a making-available right.179 The word
"distributed" in 1976 had a considerably narrower public meaning
than the words "available" and "published."180  A broad definition
would interpret "distribute" as offering, soliciting the taking of, or
advertising. A narrower one would interpret "distribute" as the
sorting, sending, or placing of things, as in an allotment or division of
land among persons, a delivery of magazines or products, a
franchising of a business, or a spreading of seeds on land. As Peter S.
Menell points out, the dictionary meaning of "distribute" relates to the
division or placement of several members of a group of things, the
spreading out or scattering of things, the separation of concepts into
classes or species, or the marketing of a commodity in a particular
area.181  Each of these definitions implies a "sending" of sorts.
Congress also dealt separately with the importation of copies for
purposes of distribution, thereby negating the implication that the
"distribution" right already extended to acts prior to an actual
distribution.
8 2
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, as recognized in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S.
691 (1984).
178. Cristina Lipan, The Constitutionality of Anti-Bootlegging Legislation, CHRISTINA M.
LIPAN, ESQ. (Dec. 17, 2009), cristinalipan.com/articles/anti-bootlegging.
179. See, e.g., Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 757-58, 760-62 (7th Cir. 2012)
(noting that contributory copyright infringement requires either direct participation in a
performance by owning a server from which the performance is transmitted directly to the
viewer's computer, or by making a copy of the performance) (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,
536 F.3d 121, 139 (2nd Cir. 2008) (stating that making copies of television shows available to
users of a cable service is not a direct infringement by reproduction or distribution to viewers'
dedicated storage space, unless viewers do not decide when to view the copies); Atl. Recording
Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 982-83 (D. Ariz. 2008) (questioning whether infringement
may occur without making copies or delivering them to another person); Atl. Recording Corp. v.
Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 281-82 (D. Conn. 2008); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542
F. Supp. 2d 153, 173 (D. Mass. 2008). But see Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d
961, 969-70 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (suggesting that authorizing a distribution is already a distribution
by making the work available).
180. "[T]he ordinary meaning of the word 'distribute,' as defined in leading dictionaries
[from 1933 and 1962], necessarily entails a transfer of ownership or possession from one person
to another." Brief for Copyright Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant at 3,
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-1497), available at
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/capitol-v-thomas/20080613LawProfsAmici.pdf.
181. See Menell, supra note 112, at 56.
182. See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2012).
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C. The Interaction of Articles 5 and 6 with Other Laws
Performance rights, and especially moral rights, will interact in
very complex ways with existing US law. Lawsuits against speakers
on matters of public import will multiply, for several reasons.
First, there may be a new class of plaintiffs to challenge the
decryption of DRM on audiovisual works for purposes of making a fair
use of them in teaching, scholarship, or subsequent creative work.1 8 3
There is a widespread consensus among academics that without clear
user and subsequent-creator rights, the WCT's requirement for
anticircumvention rules "harms legitimate interests of the public in
making fair uses, privileged uses, and other non-infringing uses of
copyrighted works." 18 4  Proposals in Congress that the WCT be
implemented in a way that did not outlaw circumvention of DRM in
order to engage in noninfringing use were rejected after software and
entertainment distribution companies opposed them. 185
Second, performers may chill fair use and republication of
public-domain works by sending demand letters to companies like
Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter, and YouTube. Google and YouTube
already process 10 million or more DMCA takedown requests per
month, in addition to similar demands originating in dozens of other
legal systems.18 6 A single DMCA consulting firm is able to send eight
million DMCA takedown demands per month.18 7 Empirical work has
also made clear that the secondary liability of websites and
183. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or 'Chilling Effects?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 643 (2005).
184. Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice
and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted
Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 984 (2007).
185. Id. at 1001.
186. See Hanley, supra note 7, at 195 ("Companies like Google must be especially
cognizant of varying foreign domestic laws on IPR because the borderless nature of the Internet
means Google is accountable to 'hundreds' of different legal systems at one time."); Mike
Masnick, MPAA: Millions of DMCA Takedowns Proves That Google Needs to Stop Piracy,
TECHDIRT (Dec. 17, 2012, 10:39 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121214/23441221394/
mpaa-millions-dmca-takedowns-proves-that-google-needs-to-stop-piracy.shtml ("'According to
Google, they receive 2.5 million [DMCA] takedown requests per week-and that data does not
even include YouTube, where an enormous amount of infringement takes place.'... The massive
expansion of copyright law and broad tools like the DMCA's notice-and-takedown lead to massive
amounts of collateral damage that-absolutely and without question-infringe on free speech
rights." (quoting Marc Miller, The Burden on Creators to Protect Their Work, MPPA BLOG (Dec.
13, 2012, 12:31 PM), http://blog.mpaa.org/BlogOS/post/2012/12/13/The-Burden-on-Creators-to-
Protect-Their-Work.aspx)).
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peer-to-peer file-sharing software is resulting in the deletion and
noncommunication of thousands of fair-use and public-domain works
without any corresponding benefit to creators and authors.188 In 2005,
Jennifer Urban and Laura Quilter released a study focused on
demand letters sent to Google and other digital media firms that
showed that many of the demands posed a "serious problem for
Internet speech" because they demanded the deletion of websites or
other communications that likely did not violate any copyright.
189
Lydia Pallas Loren argues that cases of viewpoint-based censorship
using DMCA takedowns "abound."190
Internet users could even lose their access to newly dominant
communications platforms as a result of repeatedly altering
performances. 191 AT&T has warned users that violations of moral
rights may result in termination of their Internet service. 192 A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster stands for the rule that "if a computer system
operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system
and fails to purge such material from the system, the operator knows
of and contributes to direct infringement."'193 An early version of the
ACTA contained a provision for the termination of Internet access to
users who are repeatedly accused of copyright infringement, even
prior to a trial.194 This development would have entangled
extrajudicial copyright enforcement with many unrelated aspects of
US trade with the European Union, Canada, Japan, Mexico, South
Korea, and other major trading partners. 95
Even under the existing system, which rejects moral rights and
contains many formalities, eBay and Facebook have complained of
188. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 183, at 687-88.
189. Internet Study Finds Questionable Use of Cease-and-Desist Notices, FACULTY
FOOTNOTES (USC Gould School of Law, L.A., Cal.), Fall 2006, at 2, available at
http://law.usc.edu/assets/docs/FINAL-footnotes06.pdf; see Urban & Quilter, supra note 182, at
687.
190. Lydia Pallas Loren, Deterring Abuse of the Copyright Takedown Regime by Taking
Misrepresentation Claims Seriously, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 747 (2011).
191. See AT&T Acceptable Use Policy, AT&T, http://www.corp.att.com/aup (last visited
Oct. 28, 2013).
192. Id.
193. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
194. See Hanley, supra note 7, at 200. Although the language is less directly aimed at the
Internet, there may be an argument that under the final version of ACTA, states Party are
required to empower courts or other "authorities" to destroy computers, servers, or hard drives
"predominantly used in the creation of counterfeit trademark goods or pirated copyright goods."
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), art. 25.4 (2010), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/
2417.
195. See Hanley, supra note 7, at 191-92, 200 (citing Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement Final; Group Calls Process 'Unconstitutional', 81 PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND
COPYRIGHT JOURNAL (BNA) 72 (2010), available at http://www.bna.com/anticounterfeiting-trade-
agreement-n6476/).
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"the suppression of some lawful, creative works and uses as a
by-product of extra protection for other creative works and uses."1
96
eBay, Yahoo!, AOL, and Facebook describe grave threats to "many
innovative Internet-based services, marketplaces, communities, and
platforms, [which] have arisen or expanded due in substantial part to
the safe harbor."1 97 The National Alliance for Media Art and Culture
points out: "broadcasters [have] sent DMCA takedown notices to
remove political ads from a number of [political] campaigns without
considering fair use and ... such removal chilled political speech."
198
The NGO Public Knowledge contends that "time sensitive videos
making fair use of clips [may be] automatically blocked, their
timeliness and impact [being] lost and they [will be] effectively
censored." 199
Third, performers will be new claimants for statutory damages
if the US implementation of the AV Treaty is similar to its
implementation of the WPPT. Small businesses such as bars, retail
establishments, and restaurants could be liable for $100,000 per night
for performances during musical sets that imitate those of prior
musical artists, even though the establishments had a BMI or ASCAP
license.200 Statutory damages under section 504(c)(1) of the Copyright
Act may range up to $150,000.201 As Judge Kimba Wood noted in
Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, an allegation of infringement
involving 11,000 works may, by multiplication across infringers and
according to the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)'s
theories, become a claim for damages of tens of trillions of dollars,
perhaps even more money than has even been printed.
20 2
196. Brief for Amici Curiae eBay Inc. et al. Supporting Defendants-Appellees and Urging
Affirmance at 28, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3270-cv),
2011 WL 1536815.
197. Id. at 8.
198. Brief of Amici Curiae National Alliance for Media Art and Culture and the Alliance
for Community Media in Support of Defendants-Appellees and in Support of Affirmance at 21-
22, Viacom Int'l, Inc., v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3270-cv), 2011 WL
1461433.
199. Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Knowledge in Support of Affirmance for Defendants-
Appellees at 11, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3270-cv),
2011 WL 4541963 [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Knowledge].
200. Cf. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CDZ, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 930, 936-37 (C.D. Ill. 2010).
201. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012); see Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441
(2009).
202. Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
("If Plaintiffs were able to pursue a statutory damage theory predicated on the number of direct
infringers per work, Defendants' damages could reach into the trillions."); see also id. at 317 &
n.3 (suggesting figures of $150,000 per infringer and 500 million downloads); Victor Li,
Manhattan Federal Judge Kimba Wood Calls Record Companies' Request for $75 Trillion in
Damages Absurd' in Lime Wire Copyright Case, AM. LAW. (Mar. 15, 2011),
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The Consumer Electronics Association (CEA) has estimated
that YouTube could be liable for between $11 and $500 billion in
statutory damages per year, and Facebook for $36 trillion to more
than $360 trillion per year.20 3 As the National Venture Capital
Association stated in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: "[T]he
threat of secondary liability from copyright suits is qualitatively
different from most other sorts of business risk that investors can
insure against or build into their risk calculations. The mandatory
mechanism of statutory damages-designed to discourage direct
infringement-has crushing implications for vendors of multi-purpose
technologies, where damages from unforeseen users can quickly
mount in the millions and even billions of dollars."
20 4
Facing these unprecedented threats, YouTube increasingly
relies on "automated content matching" as a form of self-regulation.
Automated content matching creates thousands of false positives and
is unable to distinguish fair use, which will "inevitably reduce the free
flow of speech and expression online."20 5  On YouTube, more than
7,300 videos are "flagged" for copyright infringements annually due to
"false positives" during "content matching" even "when they did
not... match a clip provided by... cooperating copyright holders."
206
Human Rights Watch and others argue that the statutory-damages
remedy for online streaming sites that allow audiovisual works to be
communicated, including derivative works and nonliteral copies or
imitations, will "drive smaller firms and non-profits to the sidelines"
and "is certain to deter firms that might otherwise enter the field to
http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202486102650&slreturn=201301241
64509 (noting that Limewire and "record companies" disputed whether damages should be
addressed on a per-download or per-work basis, and that on a per-download basis there would be
$75 trillion in damages).
203. The association notes that if one percent of videos uploaded to YouTube infringed,
and statutory damages are set at $10,000 per work, YouTube would face $11 billion in statutory
damages per year assuming no overlap among works (if 50 percent of videos infringed, which is
also possible, the total would be $500 billion), while if one percent of photographs uploaded to
Facebook infringed, and statutory damages are set at $10,000 per work (assuming no overlap),
Facebook would face $36 trillion in statutory damages per year (and using a statutory damages
figure of $100,000 per work, the total would be $360 trillion). Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumer
Electronics Ass'n in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 4, 23-24, Viacom Int'l Inc., v.
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3720-cv), 2011 WL 1356931.
204. Brief of the National Venture Capital Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 17, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005
WL 497759.
205. Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Knowledge, supra note 198, at 11.
206. Id. at 9-10.
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develop the next 'generation' of internet-based platforms and media,
those that will make Facebook and YouTube seem dated."
20 7
The creation of audiovisual rights that would immediately be
infringed en masse (due to the nature of the Internet), and resolved
only via complex licensing mechanisms (such as the one attempted in
the Google Book Search case), would create headaches from the
perspective of antitrust and competition law.20 8 As the music and
motion-picture industries raised claims of mass infringement against
peer-to-peer services like Napster and Scour Exchange, they formed
joint ventures like MusicNet, PressPlay, and Movielink. These
ventures generated multiple potential antitrust violations in terms of
price coordination, the leveraging of copyright licenses into control
over distribution channels, joint decision making by rivals on output
levels, and information sharing among rivals that could suppress
competitive vigor.20 9 Google's competitors have raised concerns that
its proposed licensing of orphan works through class-action
representatives, which was submitted to a federal court, could grant it
an unstoppable advantage in the digital-library and Internet-search
markets. 210 James Grimmelman argues that Google's license to make
a digital bookstore could bring about "coordinated pricing [that] would
amount to an anti-competitive price-fixing scheme."
211
While there is nothing necessarily unlawful about unions of
performers or authors of any kind, guilds of producers of audiovisual
works, empowered by the AV Treaty to reach collective settlements
with Internet entertainment services, could be dangerous to the public
interest. For example, the Dramatists Guild filed an antitrust
counterclaim against The League of New York Theaters and
Producers, Inc. in 1982.212 The Guild alleged that the League, its
President, and the investors controlling a monopoly market share of
"first class theaters" in New York City had conspired to "fix, stabilize
207. Brief for Human Rights Watch et al. Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 20,
Viacom Int'l Inc., v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3720-cv), 2010 WL
6510812.
208. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d. 666, 669-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61
U. MIAMI L. REV. 87, 91 (2006).
209. See Katherine L. Race, The Future of Digital Movie Distribution on the Internet:
Antitrust Concerns with the Movielink and Movies.Corn Proposals, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 89, 126-27, 134-35 (2003); Travis, supra note 208, at 158-59.
210. See Objection of Amazon.com, Inc., to Proposed Amended Settlement at 1, 9, 18-32,
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 105CV08136), 2010 WL
451143.
211. James Grimmelmann, Future Conduct and the Limits of Class-Action Settlements,
91 N.C. L. REV. 387, 420 (2013).
212. See Barr v. Dramatists Guild, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 555, 557-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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and/or maintain at artificially low and noncompetitive levels the
compensation received by playwrights."213  Similarly, athletes and
musicians have complained of associations and leagues conspiring to
reduce the compensation paid to performers in sporting events and
recorded music. 214 Freelance photographers alleged that news outlets
suppressed the licensing payments due for photographs of events.
215
Broadcasters and the Department of Justice have also challenged the
actions of collective-licensing organizations to fix the prices paid by
radio and television stations to perform copyrighted music.
216
Moreover, such guilds and leagues may inhibit the freedom of
expression. Jessica Litman remarks that according to the Dramatists
Guild of America, extending copyright protection to the directors and
producers of performances of dramatic works would "infringe on the
rights of dramatists to own and control their plays, and may inhibit
213. Id.; see Alison Zamora, The Playwright Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act:
Empowering the "Starving Artist" Through the Convergence of Copyright, Labor, and Antitrust
Policies, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 395, 407 (2006); Ashley Kelly, Comment, Bargaining
Power on Broadway: Why Congress Should Pass the Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative
Act in the Era of Hollywood on Broadway, 16 J.L. & POLY 877, 904 (2008); Carol Lawson,
Dramatists Guild Sued Over Royalty Payments, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1982,
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/28/theater/dramatists-guild-sued-over-royalty-payments.htm].
214. See, e.g., Agnew v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 683 F.3d 328, 332-33 (7th Cir.
2012) (describing allegations that injured student-athletes' "failure to acquire a scholarship
equal to the full cost of obtaining a bachelor's degree is the result of the NCAA's regulation of
participating schools' athletic scholarships," including a "one-year scholarship limit, which
prohibits NCAA member schools from offering student-athletes multi-year scholarships," and a
"cap on the number of athletic scholarships a school can offer for each team in a given year");
Nat'l Ass'n Freelance Photographers v. Associated Press, No. 97 Civ. 2267(DLC), 1997 WL
759456, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec 10, 1997) (describing claims of antitrust and copyright infringement
by freelance photographers' association seeking "declaratory and injunctive relief largely on the
basis of AP's practice of requiring photographers who are on assignment for AP, and from whom
it buys photographs, to assign their copyrights in those photographs to A.P as a condition of
sale"); United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings as Work Made for Hire: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 155-56 (2000) [hereinafter Hearings on Work Made for Hire] (statement of Sheryl Crow,
artist) (complaining that singer-songwriters are not treated as authors of recordings by record
companies despite performing the song and financing the recording in many cases, and
suggesting some coordination by companies to bring about this state of affairs); Valerie Alter,
Note, Building Rome in a Day: What Should We Expect from the RIAA?, 26 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 155, 164-65 (2003) (describing disputes between RIAA and "Hole" frontwoman
Courtney Love, and Smashing Pumpkins group as well); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives:
Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 592-605 (2010)
(collecting sources regarding disputes between blues musicians and record companies).
215. See Nat'l Ass'n Freelance Photographers, 1997 WL 759456, at *8 ('The Amended
Complaint asserts antitrust and copyright infringement claims and seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief largely on the basis of AP's practice of requiring photographers who are on
assignment for AP, and from whom it buys photographs, to assign their copyrights in those
photographs to AP as a condition of sale.").
216. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 14 (1979); Michael
A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting, 24
COLUM-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349, 349-51 (2001).
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the opportunities of other professionals, and audiences, to participate
in the re-creation and enjoyment of the play."
217
V. DUE PROCESS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE US
CONSTITUTION
As Justice John Paul Stevens observed, the Constitution of the
United States contains a Liberty Clause.218 The Fifth Amendment
states that the federal government may not take away your liberty or
property without due process of law.21 9 Justice Stevens points out that
part of this liberty is the right to equal treatment.220 Akhil Reed Amar
adds that the preamble to the Constitution contains another liberty
clause, stating that the whole Constitution was ordained by "the
people of the United States, in Order to ... secure the Blessings of
Liberty to [them]selves and [their] Posterity."
221
Justice Stevens then declared in a 2004 dissent: "The gist of
the Due Process Clause, as understood at the founding and since, was
to force the Government to follow those common-law procedures
traditionally deemed necessary before depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property."222  In Joseph Story's formulation, the Due
Process Clause "in effect affirms the right of trial according to the
process and proceedings of the common law."223 Thus, when liberty is
at stake "there must in every instance be judicial proceedings,"
including "a hearing before an impartial tribunal, with proper
jurisdiction." 224  Justices Scalia and Thomas have pointed out that
"the Due Process Clause keeps punishment within the bounds
established by the legislature, and the Cruel and Unusual
217. Litman, supra note 119, at 1423 n.263 (quoting Statement: Dramatist Copyright and
Intellectual Property Rights, DRAMATISTS GUILD OF AM., http://dramatistsguild.com/about_
statementscopyright.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2010), available at http://web.archive.orgweb/
20080516092242/http://www.dramatistsguild.com/about.statements-copyright.aspx).
218. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3090-92 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing the "liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" as well as the "liberty"
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clause).
219. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
220. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3090-91 (Stevens, J. dissenting); John Paul Stevens,
The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 21-24 (1992).
221. Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 601,
626 (2001) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
222. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004).
223. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1783, at 661 (1833).
224. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 556 (citing THOMAS COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224 (1880)).
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Punishments and Excessive Fines Clauses place substantive limits
upon what those legislated bounds may be. 225
The AV Treaty will create various serious due process problems
when lawyers conversant in the DMCA invoke it. It is vague,
discriminatory, and impossible to implement. Most obviously, the ban
on the derogatory use of performances is so vague as to fail to place
Internet users on notice of which fair uses are allowed in the
audiovisual context. The Supreme Court has previously struck down
laws regulating indecent speech and the sale of depictions of cruelty to
animals on the Internet.226 The Court has demanded that Congress
use "sensitive tools" to enforce the "separation of legitimate from
illegitimate speech."227  For example, it only upheld a statute
prohibiting interstate communications that are lewd, indecent,
obscene, or lascivious with intent to harass or annoy by interpreting it
as being limited to obscenity, which has a long-standing definition.
228
Words like alteration and derogation are blunt, insensitive
instruments in relation to speech, particularly speech on the Internet,
which is often uninhibited, rowdy, and anonymous. Copyright expert
David Nimmer has warned that as copyright law becomes vaguer, "the
danger arises that the Internet itself could be prosecuted out of
existence."229 To prevent censorship of the Internet, laws must set
forth "explicit standards" in order to preclude "arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." 230  With the AV Treaty, an arbitrary
distinction is erected between Hollywood and sites like YouTube,
insofar as Hollywood may not be liable for mutilating or using without
attribution the performances of persons who consented to recordings
but who had no idea that their work would someday be played on a
DVD or website.231 The vagueness of the text facilitates this plan.
232
225. Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 803 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
226. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 462-63, 476 (2010) (holding that a
statute criminalizing animal cruelty depiction violated the First Amendment because it was so
vague that it might apply to "hunting television programs, videos, and Web sites"); Reno v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 856 (1997) (finding an indecency law's vagueness and
overbreadth violated the First Amendment).
227. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
228. See ApolloMedia Corp. v. Reno, 526 U.S. 1061 (1999), affg 19 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (ruling that the challenged provision of the statute applied only to "obscene"
communications and was therefore constitutionally valid).
229. Copyright Piracy, and H.R. 2265, the No Electronic Theft Act: Hearing on H.R. 2265
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 156 (1997) (statement of David Nimmer, on behalf of U.S. Telephone Association).
230. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (affirming the lower court's
holding that Chicago's anti-gang statute was unconstitutionally vague under this standard).
231. See AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 12.
232. See id. at arts. 5-11.
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Moreover, the federal government has been seizing websites
that do not themselves infringe copyrights. 233 The Motion Picture
Association of America sent a letter to Congress in support of SOPA in
which it claims that Congress has chosen to regulate Internet search
engines.234 The letter notes that courts are increasingly ordering the
seizure of websites without a trial based on a theory that there was
"probable cause" to believe that infringement occurred. 235  While
conceding that orders seizing dozens of domain names at a time may
harm protected speech, the letter said that the presence of
noninfringing speech does not immunize a copyright violator and that
the user may repost material after establishing compliance. 236 Would
anyone argue that the presence of an infringing melody or poster in a
Hollywood film should result in its removal from theaters subject to a
renewed release date?237  Mira Rajan argues that Hollywood
traditionally opposed performance treaties, fearing the actors and
songwriters, but changed its position in order to assert greater control
over what the rest of society does in digital environments. 238 The
proposed regime portends unequal treatment of Internet speech as
compared with Hollywood films, TV shows, and big concerts.
Misleading claims as to the ownership and infringement of
performance rights will bombard services like YouTube. 239 This will
result in the removal of First Amendment-protected speech and
233. See Letter from Floyd Abrams, on Behalf of Motion Picture Association of America
et al., to Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary 6-12 (Nov. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.mpaa.org/resources/1227ef12-e209-4edf-b8b8-bb4af768430c.pdf (writing about the
Stop Online Piracy Act).
234. See id. at 6, n.3.
235. Id. at 11.
236. See id. at 9-13.
237. A similar argument was made as to trade dress and trespass, and mockingly
dismissed by the court, in Sherwood 48 Associates v. Sony Corp. of America, 213 F. Supp. 2d 376,
377 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 76 F. App'x 389 (2d Cir. 2003).
238. See Rajan, supra note 24, at 772.
239. Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Appellees and
Affirmance at 12, Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012) (No.
11-2620), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/BrownmarkvComedy-
PartnersCA7_amicus-brief as-filed.pdf. ("Large media companies deliver hundreds of
thousands of 'takedown' notices under 17 U.S.C. § 512 each month to online service providers
who host and link to information posted by Internet users.... [and] remix video creators have
found themselves mistakenly caught in the takedown notice driftnet."); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Defendant-Appellee and Urging Affirmance at 29,
Sony BMG Music Entm't. v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1883) ("One 2006
study estimated that fully one-third of DMCA takedowns were improperly asserting
infringement claims; indeed with media companies sending as many as 160,000 takedown
notices at a time, it could hardly be otherwise."), available at https://www.eff.orglfileslfilenode/
inresonybmgetallEFFamicustenenbaum.pdf.
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ideas. 240 Misrepresentations will inevitably occur when audiovisual
performances are protected but formalities such as registration are
done away with.241 Article 17 of the AV Treaty forbids any formalities
in the audiovisual-performance ownership right, which threatens the
many important roles that formalities play in US copyright law.242 As
Jason Mazzone has argued:
The US Copyright Office registers copyrighted works, but there is no official registry for
works belonging to the public. As a result, publishers and the owners of physical copies
of works plaster copyright notices on everything. These publishers and owners also
restrict copying and extract payment from individuals who do not know better or find it
preferable not to risk a lawsuit. These circumstances have produced fraud on an untold
scale .... 243
New layers of intellectual property protection may disrupt
licensing arrangements, forcing works made possible by such licenses
or public-domain status out of circulation. 244 Owners of rights in
performances, as well as broadcasters, may use the performance right
to attack devices that permit the recording of TV shows and movies.
245
The TPP, if signed and ratified, would compound the
due-process threats posed by the AV Treaty. The TPP leverages and
multiplies all of the censorial provisions of the AV Treaty and the
WPPT by stating that criminal copyright infringement shall include
instances of "related rights infringements that have no direct or
240. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) ("A user
could have content removed, or may have his access terminated entirely. If the content infringes,
justice has been done. But if it does not, speech protected under the First Amendment could be
removed.").
241. Cf. MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.04 (2007)
("[T]his treatise attests to how difficult it can be to determine whether all the elements of
infringement are present-from proper ownership and standing to lack of license (express or
implied) to satisfaction of notice formalities (unless excused by national origin or otherwise), to
the perennially murky issue of fair use, and beyond."); Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1026, 1030 (2006).
242. See AV Treaty, supra note 19, art. 17.
243. Mazzone, supra note 241, at 1030.
244. See Bergmayer, supra note 91.
245. See AtI. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 3733(DAB), 2007
WL 136186, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2007) (refusing to dismiss claim that satellite radio
company infringed performances by offering recording devices that made them available at times
when they were not being transmitted to public); Lyle Preslar, Essay, Atlantic Recording
Corporation v. XM Satellite Radio: A Brief Analysis of the Case and its Implications for U.S.
Copyright Law, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 541, 544-45 (2007); Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief and Damages at 1, Atl. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., No. 06 Civ.
3733(DAB) (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2006), available at https://www.eff.org/document/atlantics-initial-
complaint-against-xm; Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Resolving Related Motions, 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (No. C 02-1955-SI), available at http://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA/MGM-v_32IStudios/20040219_
Order.pdf.
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indirect motivation of financial gain."246 Currently, the law requires
mass public distribution or infringements of works with a cumulative
retail value of more than $1000 before invoking criminal penalties. 247
The TPP may work in conjunction with the AV Treaty to
increase exponentially the complexity of licensing negotiations and
DMCA takedown disputes surrounding audiovisual clips. The TPP
requires parties to "provide that for copyright and related rights, any
person acquiring or holding any economic right in a work,
performance, or phonogram... by virtue of a contract.., shall be able
to exercise that right in that person's own name and enjoy fully the
benefits derived from that right."248 The TPP also requires courts to
presume that a person named as the "performer, or publisher of the
work, performance, or phonogram is the designated right holder in
such work, performance, or phonogram." 249 Currently, US law does
not presume this, and the burden is on the plaintiff to establish
ownership of a valid copyright. 250 Therefore, "nonexclusive licensees
cannot bring suit to enforce a copyright, even if an infringer is
operating without a license to the detriment of a nonexclusive licensee
who has paid full value for his license."25 1 At the same time that the
TPP may give nonexclusive licensees standing to send takedown
letters or file lawsuits, it also attempts to overrule the Federal Circuit
doctrine that a violation of the DMCA's anti-circumvention of TPMs
provision requires an infringement of copyright. 25 2  As a result,
takedown demands directed at websites will become even less
respectful of fair use.
The absence of formalities for performance rights will
aggravate our existing licensing chaos.253  Under the current
246. TPP vs US Law, supra note 39, art. 15.1(a).
247. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012).
248. TPP vs US Law, supra note 39, art. 4.7(b).
249. Id. art. 10.2.
250. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1996)
('To demonstrate likelihood of success, [and to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, plaintiff]
must establish prima facie a copyright infringement by showing that it owns valid copyrights
and that Tracks has engaged in unauthorized copying."), abrogated by Salinger v. Colting, 607
F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2010).
251. Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing
3-10 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.02(B)(1) (2007)).
252. See Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d
1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (requiring proof in 1201 cases that circumvention either leads to or
facilitates infringement); see also TPP vs US Law, supra note 39, art. 4.9(c) ("Each Party shall
provide that a violation of a measure implementing this paragraph is a separate cause of action,
independent of any infringement that might occur under the Party's law on copyright and related
rights.").
253. See Giancarlo F. Frosio, Google Books Rejected: Taking the Orphans to the Digital
Public Library of Alexandria, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 81, 88 (2011)
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system-one of reduced but still present formalities-the American
Library Association identifies a large group of "orphan works" whose
rights holders cannot be located even by well-intentioned creators and
users. 254 The Library of Congress has already reported that it did not
preserve many films representing our shared cultural heritage
because it could not locate the production companies to inquire about
licensing the work. 255 Google argues that "the difficulty and cost of
even locating the relevant 'rightsholder' from whom a license might be
negotiated are . . . often insurmountable."
256
The Society of American Archivists has warned that non-US
"traditions employ the notion of 'moral rights' in copyright law to
prevent the use of unpublished material and thereby censor
history."257 The society urged against codifying additional exclusive
rights.258 The new layer of protection for performers will complicate
licensees' relationships with producers, labels, studios, composers,
performers, and post-production engineers and technicians. 259  A
coalition of digital libraries and subscription information services
confirmed that when an additional layer of freelancer rights becomes
enforceable as to collective works of authorship, digital archives must
withdraw many such works because it would be "impossible" to secure
consents from all such freelancers. 260  Diane Zimmerman
(discussing a survey of twenty-two "institutions involved in the digitization of works" that
revealed that the "high number of orphan works," defined as those whose rights holders are very
difficult or impossible to locate, "together with high transaction costs, may present an
overwhelming burden for several digitization projects," and that prior "rights clearance can be
prohibitively costly and complex for many institutions" so that "social value of digitizing our
cultural heritage, in terms of openness and accessibility, may be eradicated by copyright
strictures.") (footnotes omitted).
254. See Brief Amici Curiae of American Library Ass'n et al. in Support of Petitioners at
22, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2533007.
255. See 1 LIBRARY OF CONG., FILM PRESERVATION 1993: A STUDY OF THE CURRENT
STATE OF AMERICAN FILM PRESERVATION 5 (1993), available at http://www.loc.gov/film/study
.html; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Can Our Culture Be Saved? The Future of Digital Archiving,
91 MINN. L. REV. 989, 1036 n.220 (2007). Citing this study and other evidence, Lydia Pallas
Loren argues that many films that are not being distributed or whose copyright owners have
died or left the business are being "held hostage" by overbroad and overly lengthy copyrights.
Lydia Pallas Loren, Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage Works, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1431, 1452 (2012).
256. Brief for Google, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14, Golan v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545) 2011 WL 2533006.
257. Letter from Steven Hensen, President, Soc'y of Am. Archivists, to Velicia Steadman,
Director, USPTO (Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom
olia/haguecomments/tab09.pdf.
258. See id.
259. See Rajan, supra note 24, at 771-72.
260. Brief for Advance Publications, Inc. et al. Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-
Appellees at 16, Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005) (No. 04-0263-
CV(L)), 2004 WL 3756762. The other amici contributing to this brief were Proquest Information
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argues: "[e]ven if ownership determination were possible, the costs of
multiple searches for thousands of rights holders would often be too
high for a prospective user to bear," and "the licensing fee demands for
use of the works in question, cumulatively, may be high enough to
render a preservation project infeasible."
261
The AV Treaty's ban on exceptions to performance rights will
also create havoc with fair use rights. It may narrow exceptions in US
law that interfere with performers' significant sources of royalties. As
Judge Pierre Leval of the Second Circuit pointed out, "By definition
every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because the
secondary user has not paid royalties."26 2  Another judge on the
Second Circuit has warned of a circular approach whereby rights
holders argue that they would like to charge permission for every use
and therefore that research is not a fair use. 263 The Second Circuit
resolved this question in 2006, holding that fair use is possible even
though a market exists to license the use and there was a formal
willingness to pay for a license.
264
The statutory damages that may be available under US law if
ordinary copyright remedies are extended to performance rights will
threaten to violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, as well as the Due Process Clause.26 5 Although one line
of authority states that statutory damages are not subject to Eighth
Amendment analysis,266 another states that civil fines and forfeitures
and Learning Company, Reed Elsevier Inc., Inc., Association of American Publishers, Dow Jones
& Company, Inc., Gannett Co., Gruner*Jahr USA Publishing, the Hearst Corporation, Magazine
Publishers of America, the New York Times Company, Time Inc., Tribune Company, and the
Washington Post Company. See id. at 1-2.
261. Zimmerman, supra note 255, at 1036.
262. Leval, supra note 70, at 1124; see also Loren, Redefining the Market Failure
Approach to Fair Use, supra note 70, at 4-5 (noting that "courts often view an assertion of fair
use by a copyright defendant suspiciously" and "have not fully embraced the importance of fair
use as a counterbalance to the limited monopoly rights granted to copyright owners").
263. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 934 (2d Cir. 1994) (Jacobs,
J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority as to whether a use "becomes unfair when the
copyright holder develops a way to exact an additional price for the [use]"). The Second Circuit
subsequently rejected an "argument for actual market harm ... that the defendant has deprived
her of a licensing fee," because a copyright owner is "not entitled to a licensing fee for a work that
otherwise qualifies for the fair use defense." Liebovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d
109, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1998).
264. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cr.
2006).
265. See Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 804-05 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 606-18 (1993); Samuelson & Wheatland,
supra note 200, at 441, 480-506.
266. See St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919) (concluding the
statutory damages award satisfies Due Process Clause as long as it "cannot be said to be so
severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously unreasonable.");
Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587-88 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying
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are punitive if not tied to a remedial purpose. 267 The trillions of
dollars confronting YouTube in theoretical copyright liability for
knowingly displaying and performing protected performances,
typically in mutilated clip form without the credits or packaging, may
exceed by many orders of magnitude the harm done by the site to
authors and performers. 268 The result will be a harsh chilling effect on
fair-use speech such as mashups.
269
There are alternative ways of protecting performers without
trampling on the human right to communicate and exchange one's
views with other persons. At least six pro-performer reforms could
help ameliorate the problems of lack of compensation and control
delineated by Bardem and others. 270 Congress might, for example:
1. Rewrite the termination-of-rights statute271 in the Copyright
Act so that musicians and other performers are less likely to lose their
termination rights due to work-made-for-hire status;
272
2. Place a levy on digital devices, computer hardware, and
some storage media in order to harness Moore's Law to compensate
performers for the many uncompensated uses of their works in online
services or stored on digital devices;
273
3. Raise the mechanical and radio royalties paid by record
companies and radio stations to composers of music or the publishers
Williams to copyright damages); Centerline Equip. Corp. v. Banner Pers. Serv., Inc., 545 F.
Supp. 2d 768, 777 (N.D. Il1. 2008) (applying Williams to Telephone Consumer Protection Act
statutory-damages scheme); Verizon California Inc. v. OnlineNIC, Inc., C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009
WL 2706393, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009) (applying Williams to Anti Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act statutory damages scheme).
267. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 606-18 (1993) (rejecting the
argument that "the Eighth Amendment cannot apply to a civil proceeding unless that proceeding
is so punitive that it must be considered criminal"); see also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note
200, at 496.
268. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
270. Bardemn, supra note 32.
271. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (providing the source of Congress's power to
rewrite a statute and make new law); 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (stating the conditions and effects of
terminating transfers and licenses).
272. See Hearings on Works Made for Hire, supra note 214 (requesting amendment);
Michael P. Matesky, II, Note, Whose Song Is It Anyway? When Are Sound Recordings Used in
Audiovisual Works Subject to Termination Rights and When Are They Works Made for Hire?, 5
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 63, 82 (2005) (discussing the problem with termination rights and works
made for hire).
273. See Michael Geist, Recording Industry's Digital Strategy Out of Tune, TORONTO
STAR (Feb. 19, 2007), http://www.thestar.comlbusiness/tech-news/2007/02/19/therecording
_industrys-offkey-strategy.html (noting that Canadian "private copying levy.., has generated
an enormous amount of income (over $150 million since its inception)" and "has provided peer-to-
peer file sharers with a legitimate argument that downloading for personal, non-commercial
purposes is lawful in Canada").
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who pay them royalties, as the songwriters are also frequently the
performers; 2
74
4. Increase to 75 percent or more the share of revenue from
online music services such as Pandora that go to the performer or
band, rather than allocating 50 percent to the corporation as the
current system does, in an arrangement which may not be equitable if
the band financed the music's production, and if the label has already
recouped its marketing costs; 275
5. Allow musicians and actors to sue producers to share in
revenues for DVDs and streams as new uses that were not authorized
under the contracts governing the performers' respective original
contributions to films or television shows;27 6 or
274. See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY ET. AL., THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE DEFINITIVE
GUIDE TO THE BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 73 (10th ed. 2007) ("inder
current law, the only digital broadcasts exempt from [Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recording Act]/DMCA license fees are those emanating from 'terrestrial' radio stations ....");
Kaitlin M. Pals, Note, Facing the Music: Webcasting, Interactivity, and a Sensible Statutory
Royalty Scheme for Sound Recording Transmissions, 36 J. CORP. L. 677, 695 n.153 (2011)
("Congress did not subject terrestrial broadcasters to sound recording performance rights for
decades before the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act in 1995, enabling
terrestrial radio stations to build 'very profitable businesses on the creative works of artists and
record companies."' (quoting Webcasting FAQ, RIAA LICENSING & ROYALTIES,
http://web.archive.org/web/20021015121959/http://www.riaa.com[Licensing-Licen-3a.cfm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2011))). For example, the agreement between YouTube and the Harry Fox Agency
guarantees publishers up to 50 percent of the advertising revenue from a user-generated video
using their musical works, and 15 percent in other instances. See YouTube Licensing Offer, GCG,
http://www.youtubelicenseoffer.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) ('The National Music Publishers'
Association ('NMPA'), The Harry Fox Agency ('HFA') and YouTube are excited to offer to all
independent music publishers (regardless of affiliation with NMPA or HFA) and to non-U.S.
mechanical collection societies that have entered into reciprocal agreements with HFA, the
opportunity to opt into a direct license agreement with YouTube (the 'License Agreement')
administered by HFA (the 'YouTube Licensing Offer').").
275. See Sally Herships, Pandora Seeks Lower Royalties for Musicians, MARKETPLACE
BUS. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topicslbusiness/pandora-seeks-lower-royalties-
musicians ("Last year, Pandora spent $137 million on royalties - about half its revenues....
Pandora also has to pay [labels or] performers."); Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: The Truth
About Pandora's Payments to Artists, BILLBOARD NEWS (October 10, 2012, 3:05 PM),
http://www.billboard.combiz/articles/news/1083455/business-matters-the-truth-about-pandoras-
payments-to-artists ("Pandora doesn't actually pay artists. It pays SoundExchange, which then
gives artists 45 percent of net royalties. Half of net royalties goes to labels, and a portion may
find its way back to artists through its royalty accounting system. ... [5] percent [goes] to the
session musicians and backup singers."); Tim Westergren, Pandora and Artist Payments,
PANDORA BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012), http://blog.pandora.com/2012/10/09/pandora-and-artist-payments
("For top earners like Coldplay, Adele, Wiz Khalifa, Jason Aldean and others Pandora is already
paying over $1 million each. Drake and Lil Wayne are fast approaching a $3 million annual rate
each."). On bands and singers financing production, see Hearings on Work Made for Hire, supra
note 214.
276. See, e.g., Louis Prima's Widow Sues over Royalties, BILLBOARD,
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/76526flouis-primas-widow-sues-over-royalties (last
visited Sep. 16, 2013); cf. Louis Prima's Widow Sues Disney, READING EAGLE, July 31, 2000, at
D8.
20131 WIPO AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
6. Grant all performers the right to take possession,
individually or in proportion to their contributions to a collective
performance, of surplus, unsaleable copies of works containing their
performance that are about to be destroyed, placed in off-site storage,
or otherwise rendered inaccessible to the public.
277
Justin Hughes argues that the Lanham Act should be amended
to reverse the ruling in Dastar and to provide that a false designation
of "origin" under the Lanham Act may include a false statement of the
"person(s) defined as the author(s) of the copyrighted work under Title
17."278 This would not be a desirable response, or in the case of many
works of art and commentary even a constitutional response, to
performers' pleas for aid.279 An amicus brief to the Supreme Court in
Dastar pointed out the many problems with such an approach:
Scientists, economists, and analysts often use large amounts of data from earlier
databases in order to construct more comprehensive databases or to compare different
data sets. Similarly, historians might extract information from a table and intersperse it
throughout a text.... [T]he ethical rules of some academic disciplines require
277. This might involve the amendment of section 106 of the Copyright Act to add a new
exclusive right to preservation of a performance or other artistic contribution, which might be
phrased to state that the performer shall have no remedy if the party disposing of the remaining
copies of a performance or collection of performances proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that prior to the disposal, the disposing party or a person acting on behalf of it conducted and
documented a search, in good faith, for the performer and was unable to find him or her to offer
him or her the surplus copies. Cf. Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th
Cong. (2008) (discussing the limitation on remedies for orphan works); Matthew J. Weldon, Note,
Publishing Raymond Carver's "Original" Stories as "Fair Use," 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. 531, 562 (2009) ("The integrity right is very limited in the U.S, and literary authors
generally have no right to object to the destruction of the original or copies of a work after the
copyright has been assigned.").
278. Hughes, supra note 137, at 700.
279. See id. at 703. Protection of authors of copyrighted work from plagiarism of their
ideas may violate the First Amendment, and interference with transformative works attributed
to new authors may also violate the First Amendment. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that the lack of copyright protection for ideas
preserves the "balance between the First Amendment and copyright"); Brief of Amicus Curiae
the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Petitioners at 21, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2578555 (arguing that "by choosing which words to publish, to
distribute, and to repeat-and which not to use-a non-original speaker is making his or her own
expressive, communicative choices, deciding which speech he or she believes is valuable and
worthy of distribution to others"). Noncommercial impersonation for purposes of criticism or
parody may merit free-speech protection. See generally Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d
672, 677, 678-79 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[C]ommercial speech may be regulated in ways that would be
impermissible if the same regulation were applied to noncommercial expressions" and a "parody
site" may not violate the Lanham Act as long as it doesn't prevent "users from obtaining or using
[a party"s] goods or services."); Taubman Co. v. WebFeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that the first step in determining a Lanham Act violation is determining if the
defendant's use is commercial); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 23-33 (1st
Cir. 1987) (holding that applying an anti-dilution statute to a noncommercial parody violated the
Constitution).
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attribution of the sources of facts, but even they do not require attribution to the degree
[that a Lanham Act right to have one's status as author attributed truthfully would].280
Even more confusion would confront creative writers and
visual artists if the Lanham Act regulated express or implied
representations of fact as to the authorship of content. How would
Andy Warhol's paintings and other Pop Art have fared under such a
rule?281 And one might imagine cases in which, for example, Anne
Rice contends that there is a false designation of origin by later
authors of "sexy vampire" stories who did not credit her for their
ideas. Perhaps Bela Lugosi or Anne Rice could sue Robert Pattinson
or Stephanie Meyer under the new "authorial" Lanham Act.282 The
Lanham Act right to be protected against false or confusing
designations may be much broader and more flexible than the
"substantial similarity" standard in copyright law, so that very
dissimilar products or services may be similar enough under the
Lanham Act's multi-factor tests to establish a violation. 283 Thus,
280. Brief Amici Curiae of American Library Ass'n et al. in Support of Petitioner at 6,
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428), 2003 WL 367723.
281. Andy Warhol and other "appropriation" artists allegedly used unlicensed
advertising logos designed by other persons in their art, on some occasions at least. See JOHN R.
HALL, MARY Jo NEITZ, & MARSHALL BATTANI, SOCIOLOGY ON CULTURE 140 (2003); ANNE GILSON
LALONDE, JEROME GILSON, & KARIN GREEN, 1 TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE 5-116
(2007) ('The vogue of affixing well-known trademarks to all types of articles may well have
evolved from the Pop Art movement. Andy Warhol, an early exponent, stirred considerable
controversy in the early 1960s with his paintings of trademarked products ....").
282. Compare Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 429 (Cal. 1979) (discussing
Lugosi's development of a new, ambiguously threatening yet alluring performance of traditional
Dracula character and his asserted rights under California law), with Ann Bartow, Bloodsucking
Copyrights, 70 MD. L. REV. 62, 70, 72-73 (2010) (suggesting that Twilight series author
Stephanie Meyer "may have drawn creative blood in terms of vampirical carnal appeal" from
prior films and television shows, including those featuring Lugosi as "Dracula, [who] transforms
virginal women into sexual aggressors," and "the television show, Buffy the Vampire Slayer," as
well as "Sookie Stackhouse[-]the protagonist of True Blood, a television series pulsing with hot,
steamy human-on-vampire action[-who] fell in love with a vampire named Bill Compton," and
from "Anne Rice's successful Vampire Chronicles novels [which] channel the eroticism of
bloodsucking for an adult audience with a sultry New Orleans taste").
283. Compare Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
202, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating pornographic film "Debbie Does Dallas" likely violated
Lanham Act even though cheerleaders in film were not called "Cowboys cheerleaders" and plot of
film differed from cheerleaders' performances at football games and in related media), and Walt
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753-54, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that the
district court relied solely on "abstract" comparison of Disney trademarks and comic books'
imitation of them on multiple occasions using characters' original names and likenesses in new
and "bawdy" plots, the appellate court remanded for trial on whether "the imitation would be
seen by an adult in a counter-culture store who in all probability before seeing the imitation
would already have been struck by the incompatibility of defendants' work with Disney's, as well
as defendants' proper attribution of source [i.e. that they rather than Disney authored the
comics] in the front of each book"), and Bartow, supra note 282, at 85 n.140 (noting that
trademark law "constructs can influence the ways that copyrights in characters are perceived
and protected," and make a parody 'look like actionable disparagement that is somehow outside
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Rebecca Tushnet points out that while trademark law focuses on
"reputational concerns," copyright's "special solicitude for parody
demonstrates that its concern for creativity requires a different kind
of analysis. '2
8 4
If all other means of aiding performers should fail, a 2.5
percent tax on advertising, broadcasting, cell phone and Internet bills,
and consumer electronics would raise about $13 billion per year for
performers, including actors, dancers, singers, musicians, poets, and
performance artists. 28 5 This compares to less than $10 billion that
was earned collectively by all wage-and-salary (i.e., not self-employed)
actors and musicians, combined, in 2008.286 A levy on the
transmission of performances would be a far more efficient and
the acceptable bounds of commentary or criticism"), and William W. Fisher III, The Implications
for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1443 (2010) (noting that Lanham Act may
"penalize unauthorized modifications" when "the producer can show that the modifier's behavior
is likely to cause a significant group of consumers to believe either that the altered version was
produced by the original manufacturer or that the manufacturer sponsored the modification, the
modifier will be subject to liability under the Lanham Act"), with Salinger v. Colting, 641 F.
Supp. 2d 250, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (requiring evidence that new book contained "nearly identical
supporting characters, settings, tone, and plot devices to create a narrative that largely mirrors
that" of prior book to find substantial similarity between books), order vacated, 607 F.3d 68, 83
(2d Cir. 2010), and Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001)
(requiring evidence that a book based upon a prior book have encapsulated the prior book by
using the "very same copyrighted characters, settings, and plot" before concluding that there was
substantial similarity between them, and going on to find that the new book likely made fair use
of the prior book), and Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241-43 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that a character in a television series who had many of the powers of Superman, the
comic-book and film hero, did not result in the infringement of the character copyright because
the television series character acted differently on his "missions" than Superman would have,
but noting that "lack of substantial similarity is not a complete answer to a Lanham Act claim,
since a second comer can violate section 43(a) by falsely representing his goods as those of the
trademark owner").
284. Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,
17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 675 n.119 (1997).
285. Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 1: Taxing
Devices & Networks to Subsidize Media, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. BLOG (Mar. 24, 2010),
http://blog.pff.org/archives/2010/03/the-wrong-way-to-reinvent-media-partl-taxing-devi.html.
Depending on the cost of one's radio or television, Britain's per-capita broadcasting taxes may
represent anywhere from 5 percent of to more than 10 times the cost of purchasing a radio or
television in order to consume performances. See id.; The License Fee, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk
/aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/whoweare/licencefee (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (discussing that
"[b]etween 1 April 2010 and 31 March 2011 the cost was £145.50," or 5 percent of the cost of a
souped-up television, but more than ten times the cost of many radios and even some used or cut-
rate televisions).
286. This is a very rough estimate based on median, not average, wages. See BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 2010-2011, at
320, 329-31 (2011) (estimating median wage of $16.90 per hour for actors and that there were
56,500 actors in 2008, so if each actor worked 2,000 hours they would have earned a collective
$1.9 billion, and estimating median wage of $21.24 per hour for musicians and that there were
186,400 of them in 2008, so if each musician worked 2,000 hours in 2008 they would have earned
a collective $7.9 billion).
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liberating solution to the problem of declining employment and
incomes among performers, if this could be shown to be a problem at
all.287 Such a levy would avoid the deadweight losses inflicted on
society when false positives cause noninfringing and fair-use works to
be deleted from the Internet, the transaction costs of enforcing
exclusive rights in massive class actions, and the administrative costs
of the collective rights organization that would be needed to enforce
exclusive rights against diverse media. 288
Even setting the levy at 0.5 percent of relevant product and
service revenues to raise $2.6 billion per year, the compensation
distributed to performers would be many times greater than the
recovery obtained by them from individual downloaders, or from
intermediaries such as Napster, Grokster, Kazaa, Limewire, Veoh,
Google, or YouTube. 28 9  In opposition to such a levy, some
commentators argue that it would deter beneficial investments. 290 Yet
there has been no showing that the disincentive already imposed by
287. Although comparable figures for actors were not available, it appears that the
number of musicians, singers, and related workers like music directors and composers has grown
from 215,000 in 2002 to 240,000 in 2008, and will grow to almost 260,000 in 2018. See id. at 329.
Similarly, the number of actors, producers, and directors grew from 139,000 in 2002, to 155,100
in 2008, and the number of actors alone will probably grow by 13 percent through 2018, from
7,200 to 63,700. See id. at 320. Compare BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 2004-2005: MUSICIANS, SINGERS, AND RELATED WORKERS,
available at http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/ooh20042005/www.bls.gov/OCO/ocosO95.htm,
with BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK
2004-2005: ACTORS, PRODUCERS, AND DIRECTORS, available at http://www.umsl.edulservices/
govdocs/ooh20042005/www.bls.gov/OCO/ocosO93.htm. The 25,000 increase in the number of
working musicians, or 11.6 percent, compares to a rise in total nonfarm employment of less than
seven million from 2002 to 2008, or 5.3 percent. The expected rise in the number of actors by 13
percent from 2008-2018 is nearly triple the rate of nonfarm employment growth. See Christopher
J. Goodman & Steven M. Mance, Employment Loss and the 2007-09 Recession: An Overview,
MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Apr. 2011, at 4, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2011/04/
artlfull.pdf.
288. Cf. Jonathan Band, Cautionary Tales About Collective Rights Organizations (Sept.
19, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2149036.
289. By mid-2008, about 30,000 out of more than 200 million users of peer-to-peer file
sharing software had been sued, with most settlements generating about $3,000, for less than
$20 million in recoveries per year over the 2003-2008 period, by a rough estimate. See RIAA v.
The People: Five Years Later, Elect. Frontier Found. 10 (Sept. 2008), https://www.eff.org/fileseff-
riaa-whitepaper.pdf. Plaintiffs owning or licensing performance rights have struggled to prevail
in their lawsuits against Google, YouTube, or Veoh. See supra notes 80, 87 and accompanying
text. Napster went bankrupt with less than $10 million in assets remaining to pay performers or
their licensees. Napster Files for Bankruptcy, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2002),
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/2023201.stm. The Grokster operators agreed to pay $50 million in
settlements, or less than $20 million per year of infringements. See Grokster Quits File-Sharing
Fight, BBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4416484.stm. Google does
not appear to have paid massive settlements to performers despite admitting to hosting "over 14
million links to pirated material." Google in Talks to Cut Funding to Illegal Piracy Sites,' BBC
NEWS (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsltechnology-21505060.
290. See, e.g., Thierer & Szoka, supra note 285.
100
WIPO AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
arbitrary and potentially punitive exclusive-rights laws is less than
the disincentive threatened by an across-the-board tax on investments
in transmitting performances and providing facilities for such
transmissions, such as wired and wireless networks. 291 As many
performance-rights holders pointed out to the Supreme Court in 1995,
vigorous First Amendment speech rights may not be enjoyed if
"speculative potential harm arising from otherwise protected speech"
is actionable. 292  The "result is a disproportionately large
punitive-damage award in relation to the compensatory damages,
imposed without substantive limitation and providing no guidance to
future defendants on whether, how, or why their conduct may result
in no punitive damages or in an award that is five-hundred or
one-thousand times a plaintiffs loss."293 In further opposition to a
levy system, commentators complain of the "coercive effects of
subsidies on the independent editorial discretion of
news-gatherers. ' 294 Yet it is fairly obvious that direct coercion-in the
form of civil and criminal fines and prison terms-can be even more
limiting on journalistic "discretion." How could an editor exercise free
journalistic discretion when the use of performances to enrich political
documentaries or cultural programming could result in seizure of a
website, or a huge damages award?
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the structure and content of the AV
Treaty. It has compared its provisions to existing US law, and to
other treaties being considered by the United States. It warns of the
agreement's threats to Internet communications in general and to
mashups in particular. The threat includes potential censorship of the
critic, the dissident, the parodist, and the postmodern author by
culturally or politically powerful persons or business associations.
291. If the 30,000 Internet users who were sued or threatened with suit in relation to
music transmissions paid an average of $3,000 in settlements, and $2,000 in attorney's fees were
incurred per suit or threat, the aggregate administrative and litigation-related cost would be
$150,000,000, which might have paid $625 per musician as an equally-divided levy on products
and facilities enabling the Internet transmission of music without authorization. See RIAA v.
The People: Five Years Later, supra note 289. One study suggested that the cost of settlement
alone, not including attorney time, was $5,000 per college student. See Dirk Lasater, Comment:
"Closing Pandora's Box:" Speculative Invoicing and Opportunism in File Sharing, 12 WAKE
FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 25, 28 n.12 (2011). The cost of going to trial might exceed
$65,000, but few of the accused took this route. See id. at 28.
292. Brief Amici Curiae National Ass'n of Broadcasters et al. in Support of Petitioner at
19, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (No. 94-896), 1995 WL 17008485.
293. Id.
294. Thierer & Szoka, supra note 285.
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Such censorship threatens the First Amendment under the traditional
contours of copyright test of Eldred v. Ashcroft, and under other
Supreme Court cases addressing vague bans affecting websites, such
as bans on indecent content, annoying material, and depictions of
animal cruelty. The vagueness of the treaty's text is a Fifth
Amendment problem; so are the potential damages.
The Constitution presents us with a beautiful tapestry of rights
that have been invoked time and again to deflect rash congressional
and state legislative action. It guarantees the freedom of speech,
limited in ways analogous to those limitations existing at our nation's
birth, and due process of law consisting in judicial procedures and a
fair opportunity to be heard before liberty is denied. To abridge this
freedom or to deny due process offends the text of the Constitution and
threatens our liberties. Yet that is what happens when an arbitrary
system denies people the ability to communicate on cultural and
political themes in ways that copyright did not prevent for nearly two
centuries.
To end by appropriating an apt formulation from Professor
Akhil Reed Amar, the US Constitution's "grand phrases 'the freedom
of speech,' 'the right to keep and bear arms,' 'due process of law,' and
so on-define a basic vocabulary of liberty for ordinary citizens. '295
The Bill of Rights speaks in the name of "the People of the United
States," but if it does not "live in the hearts and minds of ordinary
Americans," it will fail to define and protect our liberties. 296
295. Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143,
1144 (1998) (Symposium on Textualism and the Constitution, panel on Textualism and the Bill
of Rights).
296. Id.
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